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Abstract
We examine the long-run consequences of the scramble for Africa among European powers in the
late 19th century and uncover the following empirical regularities. First, utilizing information on the
spatial distribution of African ethnicities before colonization, we show that apart from the land mass
and water area of an ethnicity’s historical homeland, no other geographic, economic, and historical
trait, including proxies of pre-colonial conflict, predicts partitioning by the national borders. Second, we
exploit a detailed geo-referenced database that records various types of conflict across African regions
and show that civil conflict is concentrated in the historical homeland of partitioned ethnicities. We
also document that violence against civilians (child soldiering, village burning, abductions, rapes) and
territorial changes between rebel groups, militias, and government forces are more prevalent in the
homelands of split groups. These results are robust to a rich set of local controls, the inclusion of
country fixed effects and ethnic-family fixed effects. The uncovered evidence brings in the foreground
the violent repercussions of an important aspect of European colonization, that of ethnic partitioning.
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1 Introduction
The predominant explanations on the deep roots of contemporary African underdevelopment are centered
around the influence of Europeans during the colonial period (Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002, 2005)), but also
in the centuries before colonization when close to 20 million slaves were exported from Africa (Nunn (2008),
Nunn and Wantchekon (2011)). Yet in the period between the ending of the slave trades and the colonial
rule, another major event took place in European capitals that according to the African historiography
had malicious long-lasting consequences. The "Scramble for Africa" starts with the Berlin Conference of
1884− 1885 and is completed by the turn of the 20th century. In this brief period, Europeans partitioned
Africa into spheres of influence, protectorates, colonies, and free-trade areas. The borders were designed in
European capitals at a time when Europeans had barely settled in Africa and had little -if any- knowledge
of local conditions. Despite their arbitrariness these boundaries endured after African independence in
the 1960s. As a result in many African countries a significant fraction of the population belongs to ethnic
groups that are partitioned by the national border.1
A considerable body of work (e.g., Asiwaju (1985); Dowden (2008); Wesseling (1996)) argues that
the main channel of Europeans’ influence on African development was not colonization per se, but the im-
proper border design. As Herbst (2000) summarizes "for the first time in Africa’s history [at independence],
territorial boundaries acquired salience...The boundaries were, in many ways, the most consequential part
of the colonial state." According to the African historiography, the artificial borders have led to struggles,
patronage politics, violence, and conflict, mostly by partitioning ethnic groups across more than one con-
temporary state. Ethnic partitioning has led to irredentism and has helped create an ideology of secession
and nationalism (Horowitz (1985)). Besides partitioning, Africa’s border design produced some of the
largest and most heterogeneous countries in the world, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and
Sudan. Moreover, the Scramble for Africa created many hinterland countries and states with challenging
geographies that limit the national governments’ ability to broadcast power effectively (Herbst (2000),
Collier (2007)).
Yet, there is little work formally examining the ramifications of ethnic partitioning in the context of
the Scramble for Africa. Some promising cross-country studies have touched upon this issue, showing, for
example, that the likelihood of conflict increases when there is an ethnic war in adjacent countries (Bosker
and de Ree (2010)) and that countries with straight borders where a large share of the population belongs
to ethnicities that are also present in nearby nations perform economically worse (Alesina, Easterly, and
Matuszeski (2011)). Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge there is no empirical work exploring the
consequences of ethnic partitioning for groups in Africa where the idiosyncratic border design offers the
1Asiwaju (1985) identifies 177 partitioned ethnic groups that span all African borders. Englebert, Tarango, and Carter
(2002) estimate that partitioned ethnic groups constitute on average 40% of the total population and Alesina, Easterly, and
Matuszeski (2011) estimate that in several African countries the percentage of the population that belongs to a partitioned
group exceeds 80% (e.g. Guinea-Bissau (80%); Guinea (88.4%); Eritrea (83%); Burundi (97.4%); Malawi (89%); Senegal
(91%); Rwanda (100%); Zimbabwe (99%)).
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opportunity to identify causal effects. This study is a step in this direction.
While there is little disagreement among historians that colonial (and hence post-independence)
borders were drawn with little respect to the local political geography, we start our analysis establishing
formally this thesis. We do so exploring whether partitioned ethnicities differ systematically from non-split
groups across a variety of geographic, ecological, and pre-colonial social, economic, and cultural traits.
With the sole exceptions of the size of the historical ethnic homeland and area under water, we are unable
to detect any other significant differences between partitioned and non-partitioned ethnicities with respect
to geography (elevation, distance to the coast, soil quality), the disease environment (malaria), the presence
of natural resources (diamond mines and oil fields), and measures of early contact with colonizers. We
further show that there are no systematic differences, on average, between split and non-split groups,
across several pre-colonial ethnic-specific institutional, cultural, and economic features, such as the size
of settlements, the type of the subsistence economy, proxies of urbanization (Murdock (1967)), etc. Most
importantly, we show that there is no association between ethnic partitioning and two distinct proxy
measures of pre-colonial conflict, one based on pre-colonial wars mostly between African kingdoms and
the other capturing conflict during the slave trades. Our large-scale econometric results thus support the
claim of the African historiography that in the overwhelming majority of cases, Europeans did not take
into account local political and geographic conditions while designing the borders.
We then employ the scramble for Africa as a quasi-natural experiment to assess the impact of
ethnic partitioning on regional civil conflict. Using a new rich dataset that reports detailed geo-referenced
information for 1997 − 2010 on the exact location of more than 43, 000 incidents of political violence
including battles between government forces, rebel groups and militias, changes of territorial control, as
well as violence against civilians (the latter includes murders, abductions, child soldiering raids, rapes,
mutilations), we show that civil conflict is concentrated in the homelands of partitioned ethnicities. Our
regional focus allows us to account for the numerous country-wide factors that interact with civil conflict,
such as national institutions and politics, the type of colonization, fractionalization, etc. Furthermore, by
moving the analysis from the national level to the ethnic homeland, we are able to condition on ethnic-
family fixed effects and thus take into consideration cultural, genetic, social, and economic differences across
the quite heterogeneous African ethnicities. We obtain similar results when we restrict estimation to ethnic
homelands close to national borders. Our most conservative estimates suggest that civil conflict intensity
is approximately 30% higher in areas where partitioned ethnicities reside as compared to the homelands
of ethnic groups that have not been separated by the national borders. We further find that homelands
of partitioned groups experience a 5% to 10% higher likelihood of a territorial control change between
the government and rebel groups. It is not only army fighting that is concentrated in the homelands of
partitioned groups. Violence against civilians is roughly 40% higher in regions where split groups reside.
The evidence thus uncovers the on-going violent repercussions of the colonial border design.
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1.1 Historical Background
The "Scramble for Africa" starts in the 1860s when the French and the British begin the systematic
exploration of Western Africa and sign bilateral agreements assigning spheres of influence. In the next
40 years, Europeans signed hundreds of treaties that partitioned the largely unexplored continent into
protectorates, free-trade areas, and colonies. The event that stands for the partitioning of Africa is the
conference that Otto von Bismarck organized in Berlin from November 1884 till February 1885. While
the Berlin conference discussed only the boundaries of Central Africa (the Congo Free State), it came to
symbolize the partitioning, because it laid down the principles that would be used among Europeans to
divide the continent.2 The key consideration was to preserve the "status quo" preventing conflict among
Europeans for Africa, as the memories of the European wars of the 18th-19th century were alive. As a
result, in the overwhelming majority of cases, European powers drew borders without taking into account
local conditions. African leaders were not invited and had no say.3 In many cases, European leaders
were in such a rush that they didn’t wait for the information arriving from explorers, geographers, and
missionaries. As the British prime minister at the time Lord Salisbury put it, "we have been engaged in
drawing lines upon maps where no white man’s feet have ever tord; we have been giving away mountains
and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small impediment that we never knew exactly
where the mountains and rivers and lakes were." Asiwaju (1985) summarizes that "the study of European
archives supports the accidental rather than a conspiratorial theory of the marking of African boundaries."
In line with the historical evidence, Alesina, Easterly, and Matuszeski (2011) document that eighty percent
of African borders follow latitudinal and longitudinal lines, more than in any other part of the world.
Several factors have been proposed to rationalize the idiosyncratic border design. First, at the
time Europeans had very little knowledge of local geographic conditions, as with the exception of very
few coastal areas, the continent was largely unexplored. Second, Europeans were not drawing borders
of prospective states or -in many cases- even colonies (in most cases Europeans ruled Africa indirectly
via protectorates where they had minimal presence). Third, there was a constant imperialist back and
forth with European powers swapping pieces of land with limited (at best) idea of what they were worth
of.4 Fourth, while in most cases the treaties indicated that the exact boundaries would be set by special
2Three major principles emerged from the Berlin Conference. First, the hinterland doctrine, according to which a power
claiming the coast had also a right to its interior. Yet, the applicability of this principle became problematic, as it was not
clear what exactly constitutes the hinterland. For example, at some point France demanded Nigeria claiming that it was the
hinterland of Algeria. Second, the principle of effective possession required that Europeans had to base their claim on treaties
with local tribal leaders. Yet, it was hard to assign zones of influence based on such treaties, because as Bismarck pointed out
"it was too easy to come by a piece of paper with a lot of Negro crosses at the bottom" (Wesseling (1996)). Third, the effective
occupation doctrine required that European powers exert significant control of the territory they were claiming. Yet, with the
insistence of the British this principle was soon diminished to apply mostly to the coastline.
3Asiwaju (1985) notes that "the Berlin conference, despite its importance for the subsequent history of Africa, was essentially
a European affair: there was no African representation, and African concerns were, if they mattered at all, completely marginal
to the basic economic, strategic, and political interests of the negotiating European powers".
4An illustrative example is the annexation of Katanga in Congo Free State that turned out to be its richest province. King
Leopold got Katanga in exchange for the Niari-Kwilu area that the French insisted on getting themselves. Wesseling (1996)
writes "what impelled him [Leopold] was a general imperialist surge, the desire for compensation for the Niari-Kwilu, and the
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commissions, demarcation was poor. Fifth, Europeans were not willing to sacrifice their commitment not
to go to war for any part of Africa and hence were reluctant to change colonial borders.5 In many cases
London and Paris turned down requests from local administrators to redraw the border because it did not
coincide with a physical boundary or because an ethnic group was split. Sixth, as there was an implicit
agreement between Europeans that ethnicities could freely move across colonial borders, African leaders
did not oppose the colonial design, as little changed on the ground. Asiwaju (1985) cites the Ketu king,
saying that "we regard the boundary (between Benin-Dahomey and Nigeria) separating the English and
the French, not the Yoruba." Wesseling (1996) summarizes: "The partition of Africa was recorded by the
Europeans on their maps, but the matter rested there for the time being....In Europe conquests preceded the
drawing of maps; in Africa the map was drawn, and then it was decided what was going to happen. These
maps did not therefore reflect reality but helped to create it."
The other major event in recent African history, namely the wave of independence, occurred at
a speed that not even the key protagonists expected (Herbst (2000)). The independence of Northern
African countries in the 1950s was soon followed by Ghana’s and Guinea’s independence in 1957 and
in 1958, respectively. By the end of 1966, 40 countries had gained independence. While at the time,
many proposed changing the borders, African leaders and leaving Europeans did not touch this issue.
The leaders of African independence believed that nation building and industrialization would sideline
ethnic divisions. Moreover, national leaders feared that a border realignment would threaten their position
whereas Europeans’ main objective was to maintain the special rights and corporate deals with their former
colonies, and, as such, they were also reluctant to open the border issue.6
1.2 Channels and Case Studies
Irredentism, secession, and autonomy The literature has mostly stressed the impact of ethnic
partitioning on generating irredentist demands, as split ethnicities usually want to unify with their peers
across the border.7 Somali tribes, for example, were split between three different European colonies, while
Ethiopia also got a slice. The five-pointed star in the flag of Somalia symbolizes the five regions inhabited
objective of making the new state as large as possible and filling as much of the Congo basin as possible."
5Wesseling (1996) writes "in later years, Katanga was to become a most desirable possession in the eyes of British imperi-
alists such as Cecil Rhodes and Harry Johnston. When they approached the British government on the subject, it stuck to its
guns. Anderson let them know that Leopold’s map had been recognized in 1885 and that his territory unmistakably comprised
the mining region of Katanga. What was done, was done."
6Almost all African countries accepted the colonial borders when signing the Charter of the Organization of African Union
in 1964. Only Somalia and Morocco did not accept the colonial borders. Ghana and Togo raised also objections on their
boundary that splits the Ewe.
7Horowitz (1985) notes "a quick tour d’horizon reveals the rich range of possibilities (for conflict and irredentism). The
Ghana-Togo border divides the Ewe, as the Nigeria-Benin border divides the Yoruba. There are Hausa in Nigeria and Hausa
in Niger. There are Fulani across a wide belt of West and Central Africa, Beteke in Gabon and Congo (Brazzaville), and Fang
in Cameroon, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea. The Bakongo are divided among, Zaire, Congo (Brazzaville) and Angola; the
Lunda among Zaire, Zambia, and Angola. There are Somalis in Somalia, Ethiopia„ Kenya, and Djibouti. There are Wolof in
Mauritania, in Gambia, and in Senegal, Kakwa in Sudan and in Uganda. And various Berber groups are distributed among
more than one North African state."
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by Somali tribes (Somalia, North Kenya, Southern Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Eritrea); at least three long-
lasting wars have been (partly at least) driven by the desire of Somalis in Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya
to become part of Somalia (Meredith (2005)). In our sample that covers the period 1997 − 2010, the
bulk of battles and violent events against civilians have taken place in the Ogaden region in Southern
Ethiopia where Somali tribes reside. Specifically, in Ethiopia (that in Murdock’s map comprises 48 ethnic
homelands), 33% of a total of 961 battles between government forces, rebel groups and militias as well as
19% of 295 violent events against civilians occurred in the Ogaden region where the partitioned Afar and
the other Somali clans are located (while only 7% of Ethiopia’s total population resides in these regions).
Similarly, in the initial years after independence Kenya experienced substantial conflict in the Northern
Frontier District as Somalis were fighting (shifta) for annexation to Somalia (Touval (1967)).
In line with this argument, Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009) estimate that 20% of all civil wars
in Africa have a secessionist demand. Unlike non-split groups, partitioned ethnicities have the advantage
of getting assistance from their peers on the other side of the border as well as find a safe heaven when
in need to retreat and regroup. An illustrative example is the recurring conflict in the Casamance region
in Southern Senegal, where the partitioned Diola (Jola) reside. As Gambia effectively splits Senegal into
a Northern and a Southern part, the Casamance province is disconnected from the central government
in Dakar. The independence "Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance" was supported by the
neighboring Guinea-Bissau (and to a lesser extent by Gambia), where the Diola exert a significant influence.
Our results are in line with these arguments. In Senegal Murdock (1959) maps 12 ethnic homelands. In
our sample 40% of a total of 198 battles and 40% of 140 violent events against civilians have taken place
in the homeland of the partitioned Diola, although only 5% of Senegal’s population resides there.8
Even when partitioning does not lead to secessionist demands, it may still spur conflict via shaping
ethnic politics. As Horowitz (1985) notes ethnic partitioning creates an ideology that local ethnic-specific
regional parties exploit in pursuit of their special interest. This is particularly pronounced for partitioned
groups, as the neighboring country intervenes either to support its peers or to prevent migration and
refugee flows. For example, the Ewe in Togo helped Flt.-Lt. Jerry Rawlings (half Ewe) in his coup in 1979
and 1981 to overthrow the government in Ghana. This escalated ethnic tensions between the Ewe, the
Ashanti, and the Akan, in Ghana leading to conflict in the subsequent years. Our data are in line with
this argument. While the civil war is long over, we still observe violence against civilians and (relatively
minor) conflict in the homeland of the Ewe both in Ghana and in Togo, although overall conflict in both
countries has been minimal in the past decade.
8The conflict in the Casamance region illustrates the usefulness of the ACLED data. While this conflict has resulted in
3, 000 − 5, 000 deaths and 50, 000 (internally and externally displaced) refugees over the period 1980 − 2000, this event is
not-classified as a war in most civil war datasets as deaths spread over a long period of time and the casualties threshold is
not met in any particular year (Humphreys and Mohamed (2005)).
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Suffocation and Cross-Border Migration Ethnicities in Africa are often targets of the national
government. What is different between partitioned and non-split groups is that the latter can seek shelter
at their homeland at the other side of the border. Not only this leads directly to conflict, but the population
displacement and the refugee flows may spread conflict in nearby counties. The conflict in the Alur-land
offers an illustration of this channel. The Alur had been split between the Belgian Congo and the British
Protectorate of Uganda during the late phase of the scramble for Africa (1910 − 1914). When Mobutu
Sese Seko initiated the subjugation of many minority groups in Zaire, a large portion of the Alur were
pushed to their homeland in Uganda. This in turn generated opposition from the Buganda in Southern
Uganda leading to conflict. In line with this case, Fearon and Laitin (2011) report that 31% of all civil
wars (and 57% of all ethnic wars) involve "members of a regional ethnic group that considers itself to be
the indigenous sons-of-the-soil and recent migrants from other parts of the country".
Other Aspects of the Scramble for Africa The artificial border design has contributed to
underdevelopment and conflict via channels beyond ethnic partitioning. In particular, the colonial border
drawing shaped a host of country-specific geographical and cultural characteristics including a country’s
ethnic heterogeneity, polarization, land size, access to the sea that affect development. Herbst (2000)
argues that civil conflict is more pervasive in large African countries due to geographic inequalities that
make it harder for the state to broadcast power (see also Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2012a)). Collier
(2007) discusses how the border design resulted in Africa having the largest proportion of landlocked
countries limiting their growth potential. While our analysis focuses on a single aspect of the scramble
for Africa, namely the effect of ethnic partitioning on civil conflict, we are able to account for these other
aspects of European’s influence with the inclusion of country fixed effects that absorb all time-invariant,
country-specific characteristics. Nevertheless, in the last section, we explore how these different nationwide
by-products of border drawing interact with ethnic partitioning in shaping local conflict.
1.3 Related Literature
Our paper belongs to the genre of studies that investigate the historical origins of comparative development.
The literature has mainly focused on the impact of colonization mainly via the formation of early institu-
tions (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005)), infrastructure (e.g., Huillery (2009)), and human
capital (e.g., Glaeser, LaPorta, de Silanes, and Shleifer (2004) and Easterly and Levine (2012)). Comple-
menting these works, we emphasize a neglected aspect of colonization, the drawing of political boundaries
in the end of the 20th century that resulted in a large number of partitioned ethnicities. As such our work
is mostly related to Alesina, Easterly, and Matuszeski (2011) who show that "artificial states" with straight
borders and where a significant part of the population resides in more than one country, under-perform
economically compared to more "organic" countries.
Moreover, our work fits a growing strand of literature that examines the roots of African underde-
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velopment and conflict. Nunn (2008), Nunn and Puga (2012), and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) show
that the slave trades have crucially shaped African development mostly by spurring ethnic conflict and by
lowering trust. Gennaioli and Rainer (2006, 2007) and Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2012b) show that
deeply-rooted pre-colonial ethnic institutions correlate significantly with contemporary economic develop-
ment. A closely related study is that of Besley and Reynal-Querol (2012), who use geo-referenced data
of pre-colonial conflict and show that the latter is associated with a greater prevalence of contemporary
conflict and lower levels of trust.
Our work also contributes to the literature on the origins of civil conflict that mainly examines
the role of country-level characteristics, such as income and natural resources (see Collier and Hoeﬄer
(2007) and Blattman and Miguel (2010) for reviews and Collier and Sambanis (2005) for case studies in
Africa). Of most relevance are works that link a country’s ethnic composition to civil war. While the
correlation between ethnic fragmentation and civil war is weak (Fearon and Laitin (2003)), recent studies
document interesting cross-country correlations associating various aspects of the societal structure with
armed conflict. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray (2012) show a strong
negative association between ethnic polarization and conflict. Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009) find
that the likelihood of ethnic conflict increases when a large share of the population is excluded from power.
Englebert, Tarango, and Carter (2002) show a positive cross-country correlation between proxy measures
of suffocation and dismemberment and violence, secession attempts, border disputes, and warfare.9
The correlations found in studies linking cross-country variation in border features and the distrib-
ution of ethnicities to development proxies (income or conflict) are informative; yet they cannot be easily
interpreted (see Blattman and Miguel (2010) for a discussion). The main concern is that the process of
border drawing is usually an outcome of state formation that naturally affects directly economic perfor-
mance and conflict and is related to voluntary and forced peoples’ movements as well. Moreover, as the
recent literature on state capacity shows, nation building, development, and conflict are inter-linked and
driven by hard-to-account-for factors related to societal structure and geography (see Besley and Persson
(2011)). Thus, issues of selection, reverse causation, and omitted variables are non-negligible in cross-
country works. Likewise, due to measurement error in the main independent variables, multi-colinearity,
and the limited degrees of freedom, the correlations documented in cross-country studies are often quite
sensitive even to small permutations and data revisions (see Hegre and Sambanis (2006) and especially
Ciccone and Jarocinski (2010), who show that the identification of the correlates of cross-country growth
are fragile even to minimal data revisions).
9Our paper also makes contact with the voluminous literature in political science and security studies focusing on national-
ism. Using mostly case-studies and narrative arguments this body of research examines the origins and consequences of ethnic
identification, nationalism, and irredentism (e.g. Fearon and Laitin (2000), Brancati (2006)), as well as the pros and cons of
regional separation as a solution to ethnic conflict (e.g. Horowitz (1985), Kaufman (1996, 1998) , Fearon (2004), Englebert
(2009)). See also Sambanis (2000), Chapman and Roeder (2007), and Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2009) for cross-country
regression evidence examining whether the separation of regions in response to civil war, like the one in Sudan or the secession
of Eritrea from Ethiopia result in long-lasting peace.
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By exploiting variation across ethnic homelands, we account for many of the shortcomings of existing
cross-country works. First, by showing that there are no systematic differences on average in geographic,
economic, institutional, and cultural characteristics between partitioned and non-split ethnicities, our
analysis offers large-scale econometric evidence supportive to the African historiography on the accidental
nature of most African borders. Moreover, our results that on average there is no association between ethnic
partitioning and various proxies of pre-colonial conflict and the plethora of case studies documenting the
idiosyncratic nature of African borders enhances the plausibility of our research design. Second, the use
of information on the spatial distribution of ethnicities in the end of 19th century, well before the current
national boundaries came into effect, alleviates concerns related to migratory flows ignited by the border
design. Since borders were drawn by Europeans, we are able to focus on cases where country boundaries
were not the result of political, economic, or military developments (and thus selection and reverse causation
issues are secondary -if not absent). Third, our analysis at the ethnic homeland is conceptually appealing
in the context of Africa, where ethnic identification is especially strong and conflict has a strong ethnic
component. In their synthesis of the case-study evidence on conflict in Africa and the results of cross-
country regressions, Collier and Sambanis (2005) note "the country-year is not the appropriate unit of
observation to study such wars. Instead it would be more appropriate to focus on the ethnic group or we
should analyze patterns of violence in a geographical region that does not necessarily correspond to predefined
national boundaries. With current data limitations, however, it may not be feasible to adjust the unit of
analysis problem."
Structure In the next section we first discuss how we identify partitioned ethnic groups and present
the geo-referenced civil conflict data. We then report descriptive statistics illustrating the significant differ-
ences in the likelihood and intensity of armed conflict between partitioned and non-split ethnic homelands.
In Section 3 we examine whether there are systematic differences between partitioned and non-partitioned
ethnicities with respect to an array of geographic and historical features that may independently affect
conflict. Section 4 reports our baseline estimates on the effect of ethnic partitioning on various aspects
of civil conflict. In Section 5 we report the results of our sensitivity analysis and explore heterogeneous
effects. In Section 6 we summarize discussing possible avenues for future research.
2 Data
2.1 Identifying Partitioned Ethnic Groups
We identify partitioned groups projecting contemporary national borders, as portrayed in the 2000 Digital
Chart of the World on George Peter Murdock’s Ethnolinguistic Map (1959) that depicts the spatial dis-
tribution of African ethnicities at the time of European colonization in the mid/late 19th century (Figure
8
1a).10 Murdock’s map divides Africa into 843 ethnic regions. The mapped ethnicities correspond roughly
to levels 7−8 of the Ethnologue’s language family tree. 8 areas are "uninhabited upon colonization" and are
therefore not considered in our analysis. We also drop the Guanche, a small group in the Madeira Islands
that is currently part of Portugal. Out of a total of 834 ethnicities in Murdock’s Map, the homeland of 358
groups falls into more than one contemporary country. Yet for several of these groups the overwhelming
majority of their homeland’s area (usually more than 99%) falls into a single country. For example, 99.5%
of the total area of the Ahaggaren falls into Niger and only 0.5% falls into Algeria. Since Murdock’s map
is bound to be drawn with some error, we identify as partitioned groups those ethnicities with at least
10% of their total surface area belonging to more than one countries (SPLIT ). As such the Ahaggaren is
classified as a non-split group. There are 231 ethnic groups with at least 10% of their historical homeland
falling into more than one contemporary state (Figure 1b). Appendix Table A lists partitioned ethnicities.
When we use a broader threshold of 5% we identify 267 partitioned groups. In our empirical analysis we
also exclude 8 regions where population according to the earliest post-independence census is zero. Thus,
in our baseline sample we have a total of 826 populated ethnic areas of which 230 are partitioned.11
Our procedure identifies most major ethnic groups that have been split by African borders. For
example, the Maasai are partitioned between Kenya and Tanzania (shares 62% and 38%, respectively), the
Anyi between Ghana and the Ivory Coast (shares 58% and 42%, respectively), and the Chewa between
Mozambique (50%), Malawi (34%), and Zimbabwe (16%). Other examples include the Hausa (split between
Nigeria and Niger), the Ababda (split between Egypt and Sudan), and the Bararetta Somali clans (split
between Kenya and Somalia). We also checked whether our codification of partitioned ethnicities is in line
with Asiwaju (1985), who provides the only (to our knowledge) codification of partitioned ethnicities in
10We also drop resulting from the intersection of the two maps regions of less than 100 square kilometers, as such tiny areas
are due to projection error and the lack of precision in the underlying mapping of ethnicities.
11Since in our empirical analysis we primarily explore within-country variation, in many specifications we lose observations
in countries with either one ethnic group or without variability in partitioning, namely Burundi, Djibouti, Swaziland, Comoros,
Madagascar, and Western Sahara.
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Africa. Our strategy identifies almost all ethnic groups that Asiwaju (1985) lists as partitioned.
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Figure 1a Figure 1b
We also construct a continuous index of partitioning in the spirit of the ethnic/linguistic fragmen-
tation indicators (e.g., Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003)). The continuous
index of partitioning reflects the probability that a randomly chosen pixel (area) of the historical homeland
of an ethnic group falls into a different country. The ethnic groups with the highest score in this index
are the Malinke, which are split into six different countries; the Ndembu, which are split between Angola,
Zaire, and Zambia; and the Nukwe, which are split between Angola, Namibia, Zambia, and Botswana.12
2.2 Civil Conflict Data
Our data for conflict come from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (Raleigh, Linke, and
Dowd (2012b)) that provides geo-referenced information on the location and some key characteristics of
violent events across all African countries since 1997.13 A nice feature of this dataset (compared to the
standard Correlates of War and PRIO data on civil wars) is the reporting of incidents of violence against
the civilian population. This is quite important as Africa is plagued by prolonged civil warfare that the
standard data sources of civil war miss (as they focus on battles). Not only violence against the civilian
12We prefer the binary index of partitioning for several reasons. First, all studies in African historiography suggest that what
matters for civil conflict is whether an ethnicity has been partitioned or not rather than the degree of the split. Second, there
is no clear reason why conflict propensity should monotonically increase with the degree of partitioning. Third, as Murdock’s
map certainly contains noise, this will be reflected more clearly in the continuous measure (as compared to the binary index).
Nevertheless, to show that our results are not sensitive to the index of partitioning in the Sensitivity Analysis Section we
report specifications with the continuous index.
13 In contrast the PRIO dataset just reports a centroid and an approximate radius of where most battles took place (Raleigh,
Cunningham, Wilhelmsen, and Gleditsch (2006)). In the previous draft of the paper, we used this data finding similar results
(see Supplementary Appendix Table 10).
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population, such as child soldiering raids, rapes, abductions, and burning is recurrent, but these incidents
are deadly, economically harmful, and devastating for the victims and the local community.
The ACLED database is quite rich as there are 43, 271 incidents of political violence over the period
1997 − 2010. Political violence is understood as the use of force by a group with a political purpose
or motivation. Conflict groups (actors) include rebels, militias, governments, and organized political or
ethnic groups that interact violently over issues of political authority, such as territorial control, government
control, access to resources, etc. ACLED categorizes armed conflict into 8 types. (1) Battles without change
of control; (2) Battles where rebel groups gain control of the location; (3) Battles where the government
regains control of a location; (4) Headquarter of base establishments, where rebel groups establish their
base; (5) Non-violent conflict events where rebel groups, militias or government forces proceed in non-
violent actions (without active fighting) that are, however, within the context of an on-going civil conflict
(e.g., recruitment drives and incursions); (6) Riots and protests; (7) Violence again civilians, where armed
groups (rebels, militias or government forces) attack unarmed civilians; (8) Non-Violent transfer of control.
The data are based on a quite diverse set of sources.14 For almost all countries data come from more
than ten different sources, while for most war-prone countries we have data from around twenty different
sources. This diversity assuages concerns of systematic biases in reporting from government controlled
actors and media. The data are mostly based on respectable international sources, such as the BBC (close
to 10, 000 incidents), Reuters (close to 5, 000 incidents), the Associated Press (around 1, 500 incidents),
and the Agence France Press (around 3, 500 incidents). A considerable fraction of the data (around 10%)
comes from international newspapers and media outlets from the United Kingdom, Portugal, Canada, the
United States, and Australia. ACLED also relies on reports from international and local NGOs, such as
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, and the United Nations.15 Even in cases of data coming
from local sources (around 25% of the sample), most incidents come from pan-African news agencies, such
as the All Africa network and independent —rather than government run/controlled- newspapers.
Our benchmark index of civil conflict is the count of all types of armed conflict. We also examine
the effect of ethnic partitioning on (i) the total number of battles, (ii) battles that resulted in a change
of territorial control, and (iii) violent events against civilians. Battles among armed forces account for
43.2% of all incidents; out of a total of 18, 705 battles, 2, 324 resulted in a change of territorial control.
The dataset records information on 15, 844 cases of violence against civilians (36.6% of all incidents).
Examples of battles between armed actors include the numerous fights between the Acholi-based
14 In parallel work Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti (2012), Besley and Reynal-Querol (2012), and Harari and Ferrara (2012)
also use the ACLED to study other than ethnic partitioning aspects of civil conflict.
15Going over the documentation it seems that the data are based on verified information and not simply the reproduction
of government statements and state press releases. For example, in Zimbabwe, besides data coming from BBC and Reuters
a lot of data come from Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, a coalition of nineteen human rights NGOs in Zimbabwe
that get the data from their representatives on the ground. Likewise, in Somalia a lot of data come from international NGO
CARE via its Security and Preparedness Project that “aims to reduce the risks posed to programme personnel and assets of
NGOs operating in Somalia.” Similarly, in Kenya many incidents are based on reports from the local Peace and Development
Network Trust, a local NGO, co-founded by Oxfam that monitors peace.
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Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army, and the Uganda’s People Defence
Force (UPDF); the constant fighting between the Rwandan military forces against the FDLR (Forces dé-
mocratiques de libération du Rwanda) Hutu rebels in Rwanda and in Eastern Congo; and the (relatively
small scale) battles between Kikuyu rebel groups against Maasai militias. Battles result usually in casual-
ties; for example, in a single event in September 1999 the Ugandan army killed 42 Pian warriors, coming
from the Karamojong ethnic group that is split between Uganda, Sudan, and Kenya. Battles resulting
in territorial change of control are usually more devastating involving both a higher number of casualties
and ambushes against the civilian population. For example, ACLED reports that in August 1997 when
government forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo retook control of the town of Watsa, close to the
border with Uganda, where the partitioned Alur reside, this resulted in 800 casualties.
Violent events against civilians include the raids of the Janjaweed militias against civilian popula-
tion in the Darfur region in Western Sudan; the assaults and tortures by President’s Mugabe’s Central
Intelligence Organization in Zimbabwe; the killings of civilians in Northern and Western Rwanda by the
Interahamwe Hutu ethnic militias (that are raiding from their bases in Eastern Congo and Uganda); and
the killings, abductions, rapes, and terrorist activities of militias in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Violent events include also the burning of churches, hostage-taking and child-soldiering raids by rebels in
Nigeria and in Sierra Leone. Going over the narratives of each event reveals that they may be also quite
devastating. For example, in a single event in Eastern Congo in May 1997 "ADLF rebels moved in and
took control of Mbandaka slaughtering 200 Rwandan Hutu refugees".
2.2.1 Data Patterns
Figure 2amaps the spatial distribution of all conflict events over the period 1997−2010. There is significant
heterogeneity in the incidence of political violence across Africa. There are numerous events in Central
Africa, mostly in Eastern Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, and Uganda. In Western Africa, conflict and
political violence are mostly present in Nigeria, especially in areas close to the Niger delta and in Sierra
Leone. Violence is also pervasive in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe. In contrast there are few events in
Botswana, Zambia, Tanzania, Namibia, and Gabon. There is also considerable variation within countries.
For example, while conflict incidence in Tanzania is low, there are quite a few violent incidents along the
border with Kenya and Rwanda. Likewise, most of the conflict in Senegal is concentrated on the Southern
region of Casamance, while most conflict in Angola is close to the northern border with Congo and in the
Cabinda enclave.
To construct conflict intensity at the ethnic homeland level, we project ACLED’s mapping of con-
flict events (Figure 2a) on Murdock’s ethnolinguistic map (Figure 1a). Figure 2b portrays the spatial
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distribution of all civil conflict incidents at the ethnic-homeland level.
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We examine separately the effect of partitioning on the number of battles and violence against
civilians, as these are the dominant and deadly types of conflict. Figures 3a and 3b plot the number of
battles and an indicator that identifies ethnic homelands where a battle resulted in a territorial change,
respectively. Figure 3c portrays violence against civilians. The correlation between battles and violence
against civilians in high, but far from perfect (0.60). For example, in Zimbabwe we observe many violent
events against civilians with very few battles between military actors. Conversely in Ethiopia and Sudan
we predominantly observe conflict between the government and rebel groups rather than unilateral violent
events against civilians. In the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Uganda the numbers of battles go
hand in hand with civilian violence. The correlation between battles resulting in a territorial change and
the total number of battles is 0.59 and with violent events against civilians is 0.22 (Appendix Table 1).
This suggests that in our empirical analysis we can examine the effect of ethnic partitioning not only on
overall political violence but also on its main components.
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2.2.2 Summary Statistics
Table 1 reports descriptive/summary statistics for the main outcome variables across the 826 ethnic home-
lands.16 In Panel A we report summary statistics (mean and medians) across all ethnic homelands, while in
Panel B we report statistics for homelands close to the national border (using the median value of distance
from the centroid of a group; 102 kilometers). This helps us isolate the role of ethnic partitioning from an
overall border effect (which, nonetheless, may still be driven by partitioning).
Civil Conflict Incidents: All Types Three-fourths of all ethnic areas have experienced at least
one conflict event over the period 1997−2010 (column(1)). 84% of partitioned ethnicities experienced some
conflict, while the likelihood of a civil conflict incidence for non-partitioned ethnicities is 11 percentage
points lower (73%). When we focus on groups close to the border, we observe similar differences; on average
65% of non-partitioned ethnic homelands experienced a conflict, while 83% of split groups suffered from
some type of conflict.
Partitioned groups have also experienced more violent events than non-split ones. On average parti-
tioned ethnicities experienced 64.75 incidents, while for the rest 47.6 incidents are recorded. This difference
is not statistically significant because there are some extreme cases both across partitioned and non-split
ethnic groups (see Appendix Table 2). To account for outliers we exclude ethnic homelands where capitals
fall (in (4) and (5)) and homelands where the number of armed conflicts exceeds the 99th percentile (in
(6)-(7)). The differences are now statistically significant. There are also large differences between parti-
tioned (median=13) and non-split ethnicities across the median value of conflict events (13 compared to
3). The differences in conflict intensity between partitioned and non-split ethnic groups are also sizable
when we focus on areas close to the border (Panel B). While the average (median) number of all civil
conflict incidents for partitioned ethnicities is 66 (12), for non split ones the average (median) is 32.3 (1).17
16 In Supplementary Appendix Table 2 we report summary statistics for all outcome and control variables, both at the ethnic
homeland level (Panel A) and at the country-ethnic-homeland level (Panel B). Supplementary Appendix Table 3 reports the
number of conflict incidents for each country.
17The results are similar if we use a narrower threshold of distance to the national border to identify ethnic homelands close
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Battles On average 59% of all ethnic homelands have experienced some battle between government
forces, rebel groups, or militias. The corresponding likelihood for partitioned and non-split groups in the full
sample is 63.5% and 57.7%, respectively. When we restrict estimation in areas close to the national border,
the difference between partitioned and non-split groups in the probability of experiencing at least one battle
is 15%. On average partitioned ethnic homelands have experienced ten more battles as compared to non-
split groups (29.9 versus 19.8); and while due to outliers this difference is not statistically significant, once
we exclude the top 1% of the distribution or regions where capitals fall, the difference becomes significant.
Likewise, the median value of battles for non-split ethnic groups close to the national border is zero, while
the corresponding median value for partitioned ethnic homelands is 3.
Territorial Control Change The ACLED database also reports battles that resulted in territorial
change of control. Focusing on such battles is interesting as in these cases the local population is likely to
be more dramatically affected; moreover, these incidents may reflect more accurately irredentist demands
and state collapse. The likelihood that a battle resulting in a change of territorial control for partitioned
ethnic homelands is 36%, while the corresponding likelihood for non-split groups is 22.7%. This pattern
suggests that partitioned ethnic groups are more likely to be traumatized as control oscillates between the
government and rebel forces.
Violence against Civilians The summary statistics of violence against civilians also reveal large
and significant differences between partitioned and non-split groups. The likelihood that a partitioned
ethnicity has experienced at least one violent event against the civilian population is 0.70, while the
corresponding likelihood for not split ethnicities is 0.57. The difference is even larger when we focus on
ethnic homelands close to the national border (0.24). On average partitioned ethnic homelands experience
24 violent incidents against the civilian population, while the average for non-split ethnicities is 17.6. The
median value of violence against civilians across partitioned ethnic homelands is three times the median
value across non-split groups (3 versus 1) independently on whether we examine all ethnic homelands or
we limit our attention to those close to the national border.
3 Border Artificiality
As we briefly discussed above, the African historiography provides ample evidence that, in the overwhelming
majority of cases, Europeans did not consider ethnic politics and local geography in the design of colonial
borders - that were mostly drawn before Europeans settled in Africa. In a few instances, nevertheless,
Europeans did try taking into account political geography, as, for example, in Swaziland, Burundi, and in
some parts of Uganda. Moreover, in two cases (Cameroon-Nigeria; Ghana-Togo) there were referenda on
to the national border. For example when we use the 25% percentile of distance to the border (45 km), the average (median)
number of civil conflict incidents for partitioned ethnicities is 47 (8.5) while for non-split ethnicities 4.6 (1).
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the redrawing of borders at independence. Yet what is key for establishing causality is not that all borders
are idiosyncratically drawn (though many were); what is needed for inference is that there are no major
differences between partitioned and non-split ethnic homelands across factors that may independently affect
conflict. Thus in this section we examine in detail whether there are -on average- significant differences
between the two sets of ethnicities across observable factors that may shape the propensity and intensity
of conflict.
We search for potential correlates of ethnic partitioning estimating models of the following form:
SPLITi (FRACi) = ar +X
′
iΨ+ Z
′
iΘ+ ei. (1)
The dependent variable, SPLITi, equals one when at least 10% of the historical homeland of an
ethnic group i has been partitioned into more than one contemporary state. For robustness, we also show
results using the continuous measure of partitioning, FRACi. Xi is a vector of geographic, ecological,
natural resource variables and proxies of pre-colonial conflict and development at the ethnicity level; Zi is
a vector of ethnic-specific pre-colonial institutional, cultural, and economic traits, extracted fromMurdock’s
(1967) Ethnographic Atlas that are available for a subset of African ethnicities. Appendix Table 2 reports
summary statistics for all variables. In all specifications we include region-specific constants (ar) to account
for the somewhat different timing and patterns of colonization.
3.1 Geographical, Ecological, and Natural Resource Measures
Table 2 reports probit (maximum-likelihood) marginal effects, where the dependent variable is the bench-
mark binary partitioning index (SPLIT ), and LS estimates with the continuous measure of partitioning
(FRACi) as the dependent variable.
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In Panel A we explore the role of geographic, ecological, and natural resources. Specifications
(1)-(2) show that ethnic groups spanning large territories in the pre-colonial period were more likely to
be partitioned. This is consistent with the narratives describing the idiosyncratic border drawing. The
estimates further show that ethnicities residing in areas with larger water bodies were more likely to find
themselves split by the political boundaries. This result is again in accord with the historical evidence that
Europeans attempted to use natural barriers while delineating spheres of influence.
In columns (3)-(4) we augment the specification with an index reflecting the average land quality for
agriculture and average elevation. We also add the respective standard deviations to proxy for ruggedness
and the variance of land quality. Examining the association between partitioning and land characteristics
is important because cross-country works and regional studies show that conflict is more prevalent in
mountainous or malarious terrains (e.g., Fearon and Laitin (2003), Buhaug and Rod (2006), Cervellati,
Sunde, and Valmori (2011)). All four geographic features enter with insignificant estimates.19
18The results are similar if we estimate linear probability or logit specifications or when we estimate Tobit models that
account for truncation (at zero) of the continuous partitioning index.
19 In some specifications mean land suitability for agriculture enters with a (weakly) significant estimate. We further explored
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In columns (5)-(6) we examine the role of ecological conditions, augmenting the empirical model with
a malaria stability index and distance to the coast. Since Europeans settled almost exclusively in coastal
areas and regions where malaria was less pervasive, these models shed also light on whether contact with
colonizers affected partitioning. Both indicators enter with small and statistically insignificant coefficients.
In columns (7)-(8) we include indicators identifying areas with diamond mines and petroleum fields.
While in the initial phase of colonization Europeans were mostly interested in agricultural goods and
minerals, adding these two indicators allows us to investigate whether partitioned groups differ from non-
partitioned ones in terms of natural resources that are correlated with conflict both across and within
countries (see Ross (2012) for a thorough review). There are no systematic differences between the two
groups of ethnic homelands.
3.2 Pre-colonial Conflict20
While at the time of border design in the late 19th century, Europeans had limited or absolutely no
knowledge of local political geography, it is necessary to examine the association between ethnic partitioning
and pre-colonial conflict, as recent cross-country works (Fearon and Laitin (2012)) and cross-regional studies
in Africa show a significant legacy of conflict from the pre-colonial period to contemporary times (Besley
and Reynal-Querol (2012), Nunn and Wantchekon (2011)). In Table 2 -Panel B we thus examine the
association between ethnic partitioning and two proxies of pre-colonial conflict, one based on wars between
large pre-colonial African kingdoms and one reflecting conflict during the slave trade period.
Using historical data from Brecke (1999) and Cioffi-Revilla (1996), Besley and Reynal-Querol (2012)
show that contemporary conflict is higher in regions that suffered from pre-colonial wars (such as the
Songai-Gourma conflict in contemporary Mali in the end of the 15th century or the conflict between the
powerful Banyoro and Buganda kingdoms around 1600 in contemporary Uganda). Specifications (1)-(2)
show the lack of a systematic association between ethnic partitioning and pre-colonial violence, as reflected
by an indicator that takes the value one for ethnic homelands that experienced conflict over the period
1400 − 1700. Similarly, specifications (3)-(4) show that ethnic partitioning is not related to distance to
the centroid of the closest pre-colonial conflict (the results are similar with log distance). In line with the
historical accords, these simple specifications reveal that Europeans did not take into account pre-existing
animosity between African ethnicities when designing colonial borders. More importantly for our work,
these results show that ethnic partitioning captures a distinct source of contemporary conflict to that
emphasized by Besley and Reynal-Querol (2012). And while there is some precision error on the exact
the role of land quality and dependence on agriculture using alternative measures and numerous model permutations. Overall
the correlation between ethnic partitioning and land quality is weak and in most specifications statistically indistinguishable
from zero. Even in the models where some index of land’s suitability for agriculture enters with a significant estimate, the
economic magnitude is small. Moreover, in our analysis of the effect of ethnic partitioning on civil conflict we are reporting
specifications accounting for land quality as well as numerous other local geographic controls, showing that this has no impact
on the coefficient of the partitioning index.
20We thank Francesco Caselli for proposing exploring the link between the legacy of pre-colonial conflict and ethnic parti-
tioning.
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locations of pre-colonial conflict, the data have signal, as Besley and Reynal-Querol (2012) do find a robust
positive association between pre-colonial conflict and civil wars after African independence.
As detailed in Nunn (2008) and previous historical studies, Africa experienced conflict during the
slave trades, as the most common method of enslavement was “through raids and kidnapping by members of
one ethnicity of another or even between members of the same ethnicity” (Nunn and Puga (2012)). In line
with this Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) document a strong negative within-country correlation between
historical enslavement and proxies of social capital, arguing that the long-run effect of the slave trades
works via spurring animosity between African ethnicities. Similarly Djankov and Reynal-Querol (2010)
present cross-country evidence of a significant positive association between enslavement and civil war post-
independence. In columns (5)-(6) we regress ethnic partitioning on an indicator that takes on the value
of one for ethnicities that were affected by the slave trades and zero otherwise (“extensive” margin) while
in (7)-(8) we follow Nunn (2008) and use the log of 1 plus the number of slaves normalized by the area of
each homeland. In all specifications the coefficient on slave trades is quantitatively small and statistically
indistinguishable from zero. This further assuages concerns that the ethnic partitioning index captures
pre-colonial levels of violence.
3.3 Pre-colonial Political and Economic Development
In Panel C we explore whether ethnic partitioning is related to pre-colonial political and economic develop-
ment. Both anecdotal evidence from the African historiography (Herbst (2000)) and the growing literature
on state capacity (Besley and Persson (2011)), suggests that pre-colonial conflict involved large kingdoms
with a high degree of political centralization (see also Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)). Thus we associate
ethnic partitioning with the homeland falling within the boundaries or being close to a large pre-colonial
kingdom, using data from Besley and Reynal-Querol (2012) and O’Brien (1999). There is no systematic
association between ethnic partitioning and the homeland being part of a large kingdom (columns (1)-(2)).
Likewise, models (3)-(4) show that there is no relationship between ethnic partitioning and distance to the
centroid of the closest pre-colonial kingdom.
In columns (6)-(7) we proxy the pre-slave trade level of economic development using an indicator
variable that equals one when a city with population exceeding 20, 000 people in 1400 AD was present in
the historical homeland and zero otherwise (using data from Chandler (1987)). There is no evidence that
ethnicities with historical urban centers were differentially treated during the early stage of colonization
when borders were drawn in European capitals.
In columns (7)-(8) we regress the partitioning measures on the average distance of each ethnic group
to the main European exploration routes. This helps shed light on whether Europeans used the (limited)
knowledge they had on local political geography. The coefficient is small and statistically indistinguishable
from zero.
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3.4 Ethnic-Specific Pre-colonial Traits
In Table 3 we examine whether other ethnic-specific pre-colonial institutional, cultural, and economic traits
correlate with partitioning, using the rich information provided in Murdock’s (1967) Ethnographic Atlas.
While due to the drop in the sample size, we lose efficiency, examining the role of various ethnic-specific
pre-colonial features on partitioning sheds light on the (absence of) considerations of Europeans when they
drew colonial borders in the late 19th century.
In columns (1)-(2) of Panel A - Table 3 we use an ordered variable, ranging from 0 to 7 with higher
numbers indicating more complex and more densely populated local communities. There is no associa-
tion between partitioning and pre-colonial settlement pattern. Building on the argument of the African
historiography and the results of the unified growth theory (Galor (2011)), that pre-colonial economic de-
velopment was higher in areas with intensive use of agriculture (Fenske (2012b) provides empirical support),
in (3)-(4) we proxy development at the time of colonization with a 0− 9 index measuring the importance
of agriculture, failing again to detect a systematic association. In columns (5)-(8) we further investigate
whether Europeans took into account the degree of political centralization of the African ethnicities while
designing the borders. Following Gennaioli and Rainer (2006, 2007), in (5) and (6) we proxy political
centralization with an indicator variable that equals zero when Murdock assigns an ethnicity either as
"stateless" or "a petty chiefdom" (e.g., Xam or the Tiv); and becomes 1 when the ethnicity is part of
either a "large paramount chiefdom" or a "large state" (e.g., Ganda and Zulu). Since institutional and
economic development in pre-industrial societies goes in tandem with class stratification (see Diamond
(1997)), in (7) and (8) we examine the association of ethnic partitioning and a stratification index that
ranges from zero, for societies without any class distinctions, to four, for groups with significant class and
wealth distinctions. There are no systematic differences between partitioned and non-split ethnicities along
these proxies of political centralization.
In Panel B of Table 3 we further explore the association between partitioning and numerous other
ethnic-specific variables from Murdock (1967), measuring the dependence of the economy on agriculture,
fishing, hunting, the type of family organization, the presence of rules for inheritance, the role of clans,
and other traits. There are no significant differences between split and non-partitioned ethnicities. And
while these variables do contain noise (and thus attenuation is a valid concern), measurement error cannot
fully explain the lack of significance, as many works document robust associations between several societal
traits in Murdock’s map and contemporary outcomes (e.g., Fenske (2012c), Gennaioli and Rainer (2007),
Fenske (2012a), Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2012)).
3.5 Country-Fixed-Effects Estimates
Since we mostly explore within-country variation, one would also like to know whether post-independence
there are systematic differences between partitioned ethnicities and non-split groups in the same country.
In Table 4 we report country fixed effects specifications associating geographical, ecological, and natural
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resource features with ethnic partitioning. In this case the unit of analysis becomes an ethnicity-country
observation assigning each partition to the corresponding country. The evidence suggests that the two sets
of ethnic groups are comparable. Interestingly, the positive correlation between surface and water area and
partitioning turns now insignificant. This is because after partitioning both the surface area and the area
under water of split groups within a country are similar to those of non-partitioned ethnicities.
3.6 Summary
The results in Tables 2− 4 are broadly consistent with the historical narrative on the arbitrary design of
African borders. Our results, however, do not imply that all African borders were randomly designed; this
is clearly not the case. What our large-scale econometric evidence shows is that on average there are no
systematic differences between partitioned ethnic homelands and non-split ethnic regions across observable
characteristics that may affect conflict independently.21
4 Partitioning and Civil Conflict
4.1 Econometric Specification
We estimate the long-run effect of ethnic partitioning on contemporary civil conflict running variants of
the following empirical specification:
yi,c = ac + γSPLITi +X
′
i,cΦ+ εi,c. (2)
The dependent variable, yi,c, reflects civil conflict in the historical homeland of ethnic group i in
country c. In the country-fixed-effects specifications (with ac), each partition of group i is assigned to
the corresponding country c. For example, conflict in the part of the Lobi in Ivory Coast is assigned to
Ivory Coast, while conflict in Lobi’s homeland in Burkina Faso is assigned to Burkina Faso. The coefficient
γ on SPLIT captures the direct (local) effect of ethnic partitioning on civil conflict. Given the lack of
systemic correlation between the partitioning index and various historical, ecological, and geographical
variables that previous works show that correlate with conflict the coefficient captures the local average
treatment effect of ethnic partitioning. Vector X ′i,c includes geographical, ecological, and other controls at
the country-ethnicity level.
As the dependent variable (all incidents, number of battles, violent events against civilians) is a count,
we estimate negative binomial models with maximum likelihood (Wooldridge (2002)).22 The negative
21 It is worth noting that the explanatory power of the models in Tables 2−4 is poor. Mc Fadden’s pseudo-R2 (that compares
the log likelihood value of the constant-only model with that of the full specification) is low across all permutations, at most
0.07. Likewise, the R2 of the OLS models is below 0.13. The probit specifications perform quite poorly in predicting which
ethnicities have been partitioned. For example, the specification with all the geographical, ecological, and natural resource
measures in Table 2-Panel A (not reported) predicts correctly (G(X′iΨ + Z
′
iΘ + aj) > 0.5) only 29 out of the 230 partitions
with the benchmark index (SPLIT ).
22Due to overdispersion in the dependent variable, specification tests reject the Poisson, favoring the negative binomial
model.
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binomial model accounts for the many zeros, as well as for the fact that there are a few extreme observations
in the right tail of the distribution of the dependent variable. For robustness we also report log-linear LS
specifications taking the log of one plus the respective civil conflict measure as the dependent variable.23 To
further account for outliers, we report specifications excluding homelands hosting capital cities or groups
where the dependent variable exceeds the top 1%.
In all specifications we adjust/cluster standard errors at the country level and at the ethnic-family
level using method of Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011) that accounts for arbitrary residual correlation
within each country and within each ethnic family and spatial correlation.24
4.2 Cross-Sectional Estimates
We start our analysis estimating the relationship between partitioning and civil conflict across the 826
ethnic homelands, without conditioning on country fixed effects. Table 5 reports the results. While these
estimates have many shortcomings, it is useful examining the cross-sectional patterns before moving to
the country fixed effect results. In column (1) we simply control for log population using the first post-
independence census (for most countries in the 1960s or 1970s), the log of surface area, and the log of
area under water, the only variables found to correlate with partitioning in Tables 2 − 3.25 In line with
the descriptive analysis, the coefficient on the partitioning index is positive (0.76) and highly significant.
Adding region constants (in (2)) has little effect on the estimate. In (3) we control for location augmenting
the specification with the distance from the centroid of each ethnic homeland to (i) the national border,
(ii) the sea coast, and (iii) the capital city. We also include an indicator for homelands where capitals fall.
Overall, distance to the sea enters with a positive and significant estimate suggesting that there is less
conflict in areas closer to the coast. Distance to the capital enters with a positive estimate suggesting that
there is more conflict in regions further from the capitals, though the coefficient is not always significant.
Distance to the border enters with a negative sign; yet the coefficient is not always statistically significant.
The capital city indicator enters with a positive and highly significant coefficient. This is not surprising as
violent events against civilians, riots, and protests often take place in the capitals. In spite of the inclusion
of these significant covariates, the partitioning indicator drops only slightly (0.674) and retains significance
at the 99% level.
23The non-linear estimator is more appealing than the log-linear model, because it preserves the higher moments of the
distribution (see Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Silva, Tenreyro, and Windmeijer (2010)). Standardizing the dependent variable
with land area or population yields similar results.
24Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011) explicitly cite spatial correlation as an application of the multi-way clustering
method. See Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) for analogous applications of the multi-way
clustering method in accounting for spatial correlation. Murdock (1959) assigns the 834 ethnic groups into 96 ethnolinguistic
clusters/families. In the Sensitivity Analysis Section we also report spatial lag specifications, finding similar results. We also
estimated standard errors using the method of Conley (1999) to account for spatial dependence of an unknown form, finding
similar (and if anything less conservative) errors.
25Since civil conflict may affect population dynamics, following the recommendation of Angrist and Pischke (2008) we
control for (log) population using the earliest date. As we show in Appendix Table 3 the results are very similar when we use
population estimates in 2000.
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Column (4) includes a rich set of controls, reflecting geography (land suitability for agriculture,
elevation, malaria) and natural resources (indicators for diamond mines or oil deposits). The magnitude
on the partitioning index remains unaffected. This is consistent with the findings in Table 2 showing
that partitioning is uncorrelated with these characteristics. In column (5) we drop outliers (top 1% of
the dependent variable), while in column (6) we exclude ethnic regions where capitals fall. This has little
effect on the ethnic partitioning index. The most conservative estimate implies that partitioned ethnicities
experience an increase of approximately 162 log points in the number of civil conflict incidents. This
translates into an 85% increase in civil conflict activity (exp(0.62)− 1 = 0.85) in areas where partitioned
ethnicities reside (as compared to the homelands of non-split ethnicities). The effect of ethnic partitioning
on civil conflict is quantitatively as strong as the effect of the petroleum indicator, that enters with a
positive and significant coefficient.
In (7)-(12) we restrict estimation to ethnic areas close to the national border. This allows us to
compare civil conflict intensity between partitioned ethnicities and other at-the-border ethnic groups that
were not directly affected by the artificial border design. We now have a more balanced sample with
213 partitioned ethnicities and 200 non-split groups.26 Across all permutations the coefficient on the
partitioning index is positive and highly significant, reassuring that our estimates in the full sample are
not capturing an overall border effect (which however by itself could reflect the impact of ethic split).
4.3 Within-Country Analysis
Baseline Estimates In Table 6 we report our baseline country-fixed-effects specifications associ-
ating civil conflict across ethnicity-country homelands with partitioning. Columns (1)-(6) report estimates
in the full sample, while columns (7)-(12) present results across homelands whose centroid is close to the
national border (using the median value of distance to the national border, which at the ethnicity-country
homeland level is 61km). The coefficient on the ethnic partitioning index in (1) and (2) is positive and
more than two standard errors larger than zero. The estimate in (2) implies that on average civil conflict
intensity is higher in homelands of partitioned groups by approximately 60% (exp(0.47) − 1 = 0.60). In
column (3) we control for distance to the national border, distance to the sea coast, distance to the capital,
and the capital city dummy. The coefficient, if anything, increases in absolute value, and becomes more
precisely estimated. Conditioning on the rich set of controls and accounting for outliers either by excluding
observations where capitals fall or by dropping areas where the dependent variable exceeds the top 1%
has no effect on the estimated magnitude. In columns (7)-(12) we restrict estimation across ethnic areas
that are close to the national border. Across all specifications the coefficient on ethnic partitioning is
positive (around 0.85) and highly significant. Although the coefficient in areas close to the national border
26When we restrict estimation to homelands where the centroid falls within the median value of distance to the national
border, we do not use information from 17 (out of the 230) split groups. This is because in these cases the centroid of the
partitioned ethnic area is more than 103 kilometers from the border. The results are intact if we (manually) include these
groups in the estimation close to the national border.
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is somewhat larger compared to the estimate in the full sample, a Hausman-Chow type test that compares
the estimates reveals that these differences are not statistically significant.27
While the ACLED does not report an official number of casualties, going over the description of
each event we can classify deadly incidents. As it is interesting to investigate whether ethnic partitioning
is linked to casualties, we re-run our baseline specification focusing on deadly incidents. For brevity, we
report these results in Appendix Table 4. Not only partitioning is associated with a higher incidence of
conflict, but those violent events (mostly battles and violence against civilians) were also deadly.
Ethnic Partitioning and Type of Civil Conflict In an effort to shed some light on the mech-
anism at work, in Table 7 we examine the effect of ethnic partitioning on the different types of conflict.28
We start our analysis focusing on battles between armed groups. The coefficients on ethnic partitioning
in (1)-(2) imply that fighting between government forces, militias, and rebel groups is more pervasive in
the historical homelands of partitioned groups; the estimate suggests that on average partitioned groups
experience approximately 80% (exp(0.60)−1 = 0.82) more battles as compared to non-split ethnic groups.
Limiting our focus to ethnic areas close to the national border has little effect on the estimate.
A useful feature of the ACLED is the reporting of violence against the civilian population, a socially
and economically devastating aspect of conflict that the commonly employed civil war data miss. In
columns (3), (4), (9), and (10) we examine the role of ethnic partitioning on abductions, child soldiering
raids, village burning, looting, and other incidents of violence against civilians. Ethnic partitioning is
systematically linked with civilian violence. The estimate implies that there are 65% (exp(0.50)−1 = 0.65)
more violent incidents against civilians in the homelands of partitioned ethnicities. Restricting estimation
to ethnic regions close to the national border yields similar -and if anything somewhat higher estimates
(although the difference in magnitudes is not statistically significant).
Another interesting dimension of the ACLED data is the reporting of incidents, mostly battles,
between government forces, rebel groups, and militias resulting in territorial changes. Examining instances
of territorial changes is useful as they reflect -almost by definition- the government’s lack of monopoly of
violence. In columns (5), (6), (11), and (12) we report linear probability models associating partitioning
with the likelihood that a change in territorial control occurs in an ethnic homeland. The estimates show
that partitioned ethnic homelands are more likely to swing between different control groups. The coefficient
in (6) and (12) implies that there is a 4% − 5% higher likelihood that a battle resulting in a change of
territorial control occurs in the homeland of a partitioned ethnicity. This effect is far from being small, as
in the country-ethnic homeland sample, the overall likelihood that a territorial change takes place is around
20%. The results in Table 7 are in accord with the arguments put forward by the African historiography
suggesting that areas of partitioned ethnic groups are tightly contested between the government, ethnic
27The main reason for the lack of systematic differences in the two estimates is that there are some outliers in conflict
incidence (both far and close to the national border and both in the homelands of partitioned and non-split groups).
28Appendix Table 5 reports analogous cross-sectional specifications at the ethnic homeland level.
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militias, and rebel groups.29
LS Specifications In Table 8, columns (1)-(3) and (6)-(8) we report LS specifications using
the natural log of one plus the total number of civil conflict incidents as the dependent variable. The
estimate on the partitioning index is positive and highly significant both in the full sample and when we
restrict estimation to areas close to the border.30 The estimates in the full sample imply that conflict is
approximately 20% higher in the homelands of partitioned groups, as compared to groups that were not
split by the border. Columns (4) and (9) report linear probability models where the dependent variable
is a dummy identifying areas that have experienced some civil conflict. While by solely looking at the
"extensive" margin, we do not exploit the richness of the data, we further account for the non-linear nature
of the dependent variable. Moreover, these specifications shed light on the margin that ethnic partitioning
operates on civil conflict. The estimate on ethnic partitioning implies that there is an 8% higher likelihood
that a partitioned group will suffer at least one civil conflict. We also estimated linear probability models
using as the cut-off the median number of conflicts; as the median is 2, in these specifications we just assign
regions that experienced just one incident in the group of ethnicities with no conflict. The coefficient on
the ethnic partitioning index in (5) and (10) retains its economic and statistical significance, implying that
compared to non-split groups, the likelihood that a partitioned ethnic homeland will experience more than
one conflict incident is 10% higher.
Counterfactual We also performed an out-of-sample exercise to get a rough estimate of the overall
impact of partitioning in Africa, under the heroic assumptions that borders do not split any group and there
are no spillovers. We first estimate the baseline model (without and with country fixed effects) in the group
of non-split groups (680 country-ethnicity observations). Second, we obtained out-of-sample predictions of
conflict for the group of partitioned ethnicities (502 country-ethnicity observations). Third, we compared
the predictions with the actual number of incidents. The forecast model -that does not take into account the
role of partitioning- predicts approximately 4, 300 conflict incidents in the simple specification and 6, 265
incidents when we include country fixed effects. Yet in the country-ethnic homelands of split groups we
observe 11, 731 incidents, implying that at least 5, 500 (if not 7, 500) incidents may be attributed to ethnic
partitioning. Since overall we observe 43, 271 incidents, this simple (and based on heroic assumptions)
out-of-sample calculation suggests that conflict would be 12.5% to 17.5% lower in the absence of ethnic
partitioning. When we perform the out-of-sample exercise with the linear probability specification, the
model predicts that 55% of partitioned ethnic groups would have experienced at least one conflict. In
practice, however, 66.5% of country-ethnicity homelands experienced conflict. Thus ethnic partitioning
29 In line with the arguments put forward by the African historiography that stress the role of ethnic partitioning in spuring
civil conflict, we do not detect a significant association between partitioning and riots and protests (Appendix Table 6).
30We also examined whether the coefficient estimates on the ethnic partitioning index in the full sample differs systematically
from the coefficient in the sample of ethnic homelands close to the border. The χ2 (with one degree of freedom) is in the range
of 1.5− 2.0 indicating that the estimates are statistically indistinguishable from each other.
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explains approximately 10% of overall conflict incidence.
4.4 Example: Conflict in East-Central Africa
East-Central Africa, one of the most conflict-prone regions in the world, offers an illustration of our results.
Let us start from Tanzania, a country with little conflict; in the 69 ethnic regions of Tanzania there have
been 175 incidents over the period 1997 − 2010. The mean (median) conflict per ethnic homeland is 2.5
(0). Most conflict (19 incidents) occurs at the border with Rwanda where the partitioned Rundi tribes
reside. While in the Rundi homeland only 1.3% of Tanzania’s total population lives (in both 1960 and
in 2000), the share of conflict is 27.5%. Conflict also appears in the nearby homeland of the (ethnically
similar) Ha, where militias based in nearby Rwanda and Burundi raid against the civilian population. The
share of total conflict occurring in the Ha homeland is 27.5% (19 incidents) while the share of Tanzania’s
population living in this region is 4.5%. Interestingly, there is zero conflict in the non-split homelands
of the Bende and the Fipa, although both groups reside at the border with the Democratic Republic of
Congo, the country with the highest conflict intensity in Africa. This is because lake Tanganyika serves
as the natural border of the two countries. Focusing now on the northern border of Tanzania with Kenya,
there is recurring conflict (in total 10 incidents, 15%) in the homeland of the partitioned Maasai, while the
fraction of Tanzania’s population living in the land of Maasai is 3%. For example, ACLED documents a
fight resulting in the death of 30 farmers by Maasai militia on December 8th 2000. In contrast, there is no
conflict in the Eastern part of the Tanzania-Kenya border where the non-split Pare reside.
Focusing now on the Democratic Republic of Congo, there are 4, 333 conflict events across the 102
ethnic regions (mean=26; median=4). In the homelands of the three partitioned Ruanda ethnicities (of
the Interlacustrine Bantu - Rwanda family) we observe 946 incidents (more than 20% of all conflict), while
the share of population residing in the homelands of the Hunde, the Konjo, and the Rwanda is around 6%;
and in the two adjacent non-split, but ethnically similar Rwanda groups of the Hunde and Toro we have
409 and 27 events, respectively. So while the share of Zaire’s population living in the Hunde homeland is
around 2.2%, we observe close to 10% of all conflict. Going over the event narratives reveals that conflict in
Eastern Congo is (partly at least) driven by partitioning, as it involves ethnic militias (such as the FDLR)
that constantly move across the border between Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda. The FDLR and other
Hutu-based militias, which fled Rwanda after the 1994 genocide and sought shelter in their homeland in
Eastern Congo, had played a major role in the recent civil conflict in Congo.31 In contrast there is no
conflict at the (non-split) Holoholo ethnic homeland on the Western (Zairian) bank of the Tanganyika
lake; yet in the adjacent to the Holoholo homeland in the South, in the Tabwa region we observed 91
conflict events (2%), while the share of Zaire’s population is 0.8%. This is not surprising since, although
31For example, in early 2007 in just one event, FDLR groups raided two villages killing 17 civilians and wounding 19. In
the next day FDLR militias looted 18 houses in a nearby town. Also in a single event in Fendula in Eastern Congo, (at least)
30 civilians were burned alive and 50 wounded by Rwanda militias. Prunier (2009) provides a detailed narrative of how the
partitioning of the Rwandan tribes and the genocide in Rwanda spread to Congo.
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the Eastern border of Congo with Tanzania is organic (Tanganyika lake), the Southern one with Zambia
follows a latitudinal line that splits the homeland of the Tabwa almost equally between Congo and Zambia.
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Figure 4
5 Sensitivity Analysis and Heterogeneous Effects
5.1 Main Robustness Checks
We perturbed the empirical model in various ways to explore the robustness of our findings.
Unobservables First, to account for unobservable characteristics that vary smoothly in space in
Table 9A, columns (1)-(4) we augment the specification with a cubic polynomial in latitude and longitude
of the centroid of an ethnic group in each country (see Dell (2010)).32 The coefficient on the partitioning
index remains virtually unaffected. Moreover, the estimate retains significance at the 99% confidence
level. In columns (5)-(8) we include ethnic-family fixed effects to account both for local conditions and
broad cultural, institutional, and other hard-to-observe ethnic-family factors. This robustness check is
particularly interesting, as recent works show that ethnic-specific factors, related to history, culture, the
type of political and economic organization, and genetics affect crucially development (see Nunn (2012) and
Spolaore and Wacziarg (forthcoming)). Examples of ethnic families include the Bedouin Arabs, the Tuareg,
and the Southwestern Bantu. The estimates suggest that, even when we solely examine within-country,
32Letting x denote latitude and y denote longitude the polynomial reads: x+ y + x2 + y2 + xy + x3 + y3 + x2y + xy2.
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within-ethnic-family variation, civil conflict is significantly more pervasive in border areas belonging to
partitioned ethnicities. In columns (9)-(12) we report specifications with both ethnic-family fixed effects
and the third-order polynomial in latitude and longitude; while we may be over-fitting, the coefficient on
the ethnic partitioning index retains its economic and statistical significance.
Location Second, we estimated models dropping iteratively ethnic homelands from each of the
five African regions to investigate whether the results are driven by a particular part of the continent.
Table 9B reports the results. In (1)-(2) we exclude North Africa to account for the fact that Europeans
had contacts with the northern part of the continent since the ancient times. In (3)-(4) we drop Southern
African countries. In columns (5)-(6) we drop Western African countries because some of the contemporary
African borders in this region correspond to internal administrative borders of the Federation of the French
West Africa. In (7)-(8) and (9)-(10) we exclude ethnic areas in East Africa and Central Africa, respectively.
This allows us to examine the robustness of our results to influential observations, as the most deadly and
prolonged conflicts have taken place in Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic
of Congo. Moreover, since most large pre-colonial African states were present in Ethiopia and in other
parts of Eastern Africa (Besley and Reynal-Querol (2012)), we further account for the role of pre-colonial
conflict and political development. The results show that the strong positive effect of ethnic partitioning
on civil conflict is not driven by a particular region.
Spatial Effects Third, we estimated spatial models that explicitly account for spill-overs and
for factors in nearby ethnic regions. Table 10 reports spatial lag specifications (estimated by maximum-
likelihood). Since spatial lag models are somewhat sensitive to the details of the specification, we report
estimates using two different types of (inverse) weighting matrixes (linear in distance and quadratic in
distance) and three different types of models. Accounting for spatial spill-overs in conflict as well as the
effect of the independent variables in the homelands of neighboring groups (in the Durbin and Generalized
Spatial models) has little effect on the coefficient of ethnic partitioning that retains its economic and
statistical significance.33
Data Sources Fourth, to minimize concerns related to the underlying data source, we classified
each of the approximately 43, 000 events based on the original source (international newspaper, global news
agency, NGOs, United Nations, academic bulletins, local sources) and then re-estimated the empirical
33While in the presence of externalities our estimates will be lower bounds of the effect of partitioning, in Appendix Table 7
we further explore the impact of spatial spill-overs running specifications linking conflict with ethnic partitioning conditioning
on the total number of conflicts in the same country (netting out conflict in each ethnic homeland) and conditioning on total
conflict of each ethnolinguistic family (netting out conflict of each ethnic homeland). The cross-sectional estimates reveal that
conflict is higher when an ethnic homeland falls in a conflict-prone country and when there is a lot of conflict in groups from
the same family. These results are quite interesting as they show that conflict and violence against civilians spread within
country and along ethnic family lines. Yet, this has little impact on the ethnic partitioning index that retains its economic
and statistical significance.
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specifications using events reported solely by international sources, such as global news networks (e.g.,
Associated Press, Reuters, BBC), non-African newspapers (e.g., the Guardian, New York Times, 24 Horas),
international NGOs (e.g., the Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International), and the United Nations.
Table 11-Panel A reports the results. In all specifications the coefficient on the ethnic partitioning indicator
is positive and statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. We also estimated models using only
those events reported by NGOs and the various reports of the United Nations teams. Panel B reports
the results. While the number of events drops dramatically (as we use just 15% of the data) and we lose
countries which are not covered either by NGO’s or UN reports, this minimizes concerns of any media-
specific bias. In spite of the efficiency loss, we obtain similar results.
Accounting for Pre-colonial Conflict Fifth, we estimated empirical models linking contempo-
rary conflict on ethnic partitioning, controlling for the historical legacy of violence. Table 12 reports the
results. Following Besley and Reynal-Querol (2012), in Panel A we augment the empirical specification
with the distance of the centroid of each ethnic homeland to the center of the closest pre-colonial conflict.
Given the lack of association between pre-colonial conflict and ethnic partitioning, it should come at no
surprise that the estimate on the partitioning index retains its economic and statistical significance across
all permutations. Since many wars before colonization took place in the territories of large centralized
kingdoms, in Panel B we include in the specification a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if
an ethnic homeland was part of a large pre-colonial kingdom. The coefficient on the ethnic partitioning
index is positive and highly significant.34 In Panel C, we control for the impact of conflict during the slave
trades augmenting the specification with the estimates of Nunn (2008) and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011)
on enslavement at the ethnicity level. The coefficient on the partitioning index retains intact, further
reassuring that it does not capture conflict during the pre-colonial period.
Alternative Measures of Partitioning Sixth, we repeated estimation using alternative mea-
sures of ethnic partitioning. Table 13 reports the results. Columns (1)-(3) and (7)-(9) present results
associating civil conflict with the continuous index of partitioning (FRAC). The ethnic partitioning
measure enters with a positive and highly significant coefficient, implying that a higher degree of ethnic
partitioning is associated with a higher likelihood of civil conflict. In columns (4)-(6) and (10)-(12) we
regress civil conflict on a binary index of ethnic partitioning using a 5% threshold to identify split groups.
This has little effect on our baseline results.
34To further minimize concerns that ethnic partitioning captures the legacy of pre-colonial conflict, in Appendix Table 8
we report estimates excluding all ethnic homelands that experienced significant pre-colonial conflict. The results are intact.
Likewise, in Appendix Table 9 we drop from the estimation all ethnic areas that were part of large pre-colonial states, kingdoms,
and empires. In spite of the significant drop in the number of observations, the coefficient on the ethnic partitioning index
retains its economic and statistical significance.
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Alternative Mapping of Ethnic Homelands and Ethnic Partitioning Seventh, we repeated
the analysis using Ethnologue’s database that reports the spatial distribution of linguistic groups in the
early/mid 1990s. Ethnologue explicitly maps linguistic homelands within each country making the identi-
fication of partitioned groups straightforward. Moreover, using a contemporary dataset is useful because
it contains less error than Murdock’s pre-colonial map. The disadvantage is that the current location of
ethnic groups is likely to have been affected by the border drawing, local violence, colonization, as well
as numerous country-level characteristics that affect conflict. Ethnologue includes information on 2405
linguistic groups in Africa out of which 821 are mapped in more than one countries. Partitioned groups
are 48% likely to experience at least one conflict compared to 33% for non-partitioned groups. Moreover,
conditional on having at least one conflict split groups experience an average of 61 incidents whereas non-
split ones register 34 conflict events. Overall, partitioned groups have suffered an average of 30 conflict
incidents in-between 1997− 2010 whereas groups located in a single country have experienced on average
10 conflict events. All differences are statistically significant at conventional levels. Table 14 reports cross-
sectional and within-country specifications using the Ethnologue data. Panel A reports negative binomial
maximum likelihood estimates; Panel B reports analogous LS specifications using the log of one plus the
number of all civil conflict events as the dependent variable. Columns (1)-(6) include all linguistics groups
whereas in columns (7)-(12) we focus on groups whose centroid’s distance to the national boundary is less
than the median distance (86 kilometers). The coefficient on the ethnic partitioning index is positive and
highly significant across all permutations. The most conservative estimate implies that conflict intensity is
approximately 30% (exp(0.267)− 1 = 0.30) higher in the contemporary homelands of partitioned groups.
5.2 Heterogeneous Effects
Our results suggest that ethnic partitioning has had a strong positive effect on civil conflict, on average.
Yet it may be the case that ethnic partitioning is especially harmful in certain environments. Based on
previous works on the origins of African development and the historical narratives of the influence of the
Scramble for Africa on conflict, in Table 15 we explore potential heterogeneous effects of partitioning.
Searching for heterogeneous effects is also helpful as it sheds light on how and under which circumstances
ethnic partitioning spurs conflict.
Ethnic Composition, Size, and Landlocked Countries The Scramble for Africa has led to
the creation of some very large and heterogeneous states. Moreover, the border design resulted in Africa
having the most landlocked countries across all continents. In Table 15-Panel A we examine whether these
aspects of the Scramble for Africa interact with ethnic partitioning. In columns (1)-(3) we investigate
whether the impact of ethnic partitioning differs with respect to the degree of ethnic, linguistic, or religious
fractionalization; we do so by augmenting the baseline specification with an interaction term between the
SPLIT index and a dummy identifying countries scoring above the median on the Alesina, Devleeschauwer,
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Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003) fractionalization measures. The estimates show that the impact of
ethnic partitioning is quite homogeneous and does not depend on the degree of fractionalization. The
results are similar when we group countries based on the degree of cultural fractionalization (using data
from Fearon (2003)), ethnic polarization (using the index of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005)), or ethnic
segregation (see Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) and Matuszeski and Schneider (2006)).
In column (7) we augment the specification with an interaction between the partitioning index
(SPLIT ) and a dummy variable that identifies large in terms of size countries (using the median value
of land area as a cutoff). The coefficient on the interaction term is positive, implying that the impact of
partitioning is more pronounced in large countries, such as Zaire, Sudan, and Angola. Yet the estimate
is not statistically significant at standard confidence levels. We obtain similar results when we use other
thresholds of land area to identify large countries. In column (8) we add an interaction between the
partitioning index and an indicator for landlocked countries (e.g., Chad, Burkina Faso, Rwanda, Mali,
the Central African Republic). The results suggest that ethnic partitioning is particularly deleterious for
groups in landlocked countries.
The Role of National Institutions In Table 15-Panel B we examine whether the negative
consequences of ethnic participating are mitigated in relatively more (institutionally and economically)
advanced countries. In column (1) we use a composite rule of law index that reflects the quality of
property rights and legal institutions (using data from World Bank’s Governance Matters Project). The
interaction term enters with a negative coefficient, hinting that sound national institutions may attenuate
the impact of partitioning; yet the estimate is not significant at standard confidence levels (the results are
similar with other proxies of legal quality). In column (2) we allow the effect of ethnic partitioning to
differ for democratic countries, using a binary democracy variable from Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and
Limongi (2000). The interaction enters with a significantly negative coefficient suggesting that democratic
regimes are better at dealing with the adverse consequences of ethnic partitioning. The results are similar
when we use alternative sources to identify democratic countries (Freedom House, Polity Project). In
column (3) we further explore the role of democracy interacting the partitioning index with a measure of
democratic capital (from Persson and Tabellini (2009)) that reflects counties’ experience with representative
rule (rather than the degree of democracy in a given year). The interaction is negative and significant,
further showing that democratic rule tends to reduce the negative impact of ethnic partitioning.
While these results are supportive of the idea that national institutions and democracy, in particular,
may be beneficial by lowering the propensity of conflict emerging from ethnic partitioning, they cannot
be casually interpreted because conflict may be both a cause and a consequence of institutional quality.
Moreover, both civil war and institutional quality are a function of economic development, as well as other
factors (related to geography, culture, colonization, etc.). In line with this, specification (4) shows that the
positive effect of partitioning on conflict is lower in more economically advanced countries. In columns (5)-
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(6) we jointly include in the specification the interaction between ethnic partitioning and democracy and
the interaction of ethnic partitioning with economic development. Both interactions enter with significantly
negative coefficients, implying that the attenuating effect of democracy on conflict works on top of the role
of economic development. In columns (7)-(8), following Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2008),
we use executive constraints at independence (in the 1960s) and income per capita in 1961 to identify
institutionally and economically advanced countries at the time of decolonization. The results suggest that
partitioned groups found in countries that at independence were relatively more institutionally advanced
experience today less conflict, implying that inclusive institutions may be helpful in lowering conflict
caused by ethnic partitioning. If civil conflict and institutional development are inter-liked, then these
results suggest ethnic partitioning may have contributed to the emergence and persistence of a conflict-
driven poverty trap, where partitioning has particularly strong effects in under-developed countries, which
in turn impedes the consolidation of inclusive institutions.
6 Conclusion
This study examines the consequences of a neglected aspect of colonization, the artificial drawing of political
boundaries among European powers in the end of the 19th century, which in the eve of African independence
led to the partitioning of several ethnicities across the newly created African states.
In the first part of our paper we formally explore the nature of African political boundaries. Uti-
lizing information on the spatial distribution of ethnicities at the time of colonization, we associate ethnic
partitioning with various geographic and ethnic-specific pre-colonial characteristics. With the sole excep-
tions of the size of the historical homeland and water bodies, there are no other significant differences
between partitioned and non-partitioned ethnicities. We also show that on average there are no significant
differences between partitioned and non-split groups on proxies of pre-colonial conflict, early development,
and numerous other dimensions that affect the propensity and intensity of civil conflict (such as natural
resources and ecology). Our results offer support to the African historiography on the accidental drawing
of colonial and consequently national borders in the overwhelming majority of cases.
Second, we examine the effect of ethnic partitioning on civil conflict, as this has been hypothesized to
be the major consequence of the scramble for Africa. Our analysis is based on regional data spanning the
universe of ethnic areas across Africa. We exploit a new rich geocoded dataset that reports information on
more than 43, 000 conflict events over the period 1997−2010. The database is quite useful in examining the
long-run impact of ethnic partitioning, as it reports both the precise location of battles between government
forces, militias, and rebel groups, as well as the incidents involving violence against civilians. This is key
as due to data limitations most previous works had not examined this quite damaging and economically
important aspect of conflict. Our regional focus enables us to solely examine within-country variation and
as such account for all country-level features that may affect warfare. Moreover, moving the analysis from
the country to the ethnic homeland level is appropriate as in Africa ethnicity is particularly salient and
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most conflicts and violent events have an ethnic dimension.
We find that partitioned ethnicities have suffered disproportionately more from civil conflict com-
pared to non-split ones. Battles between armed groups, as well as violence against the civilian population
are concentrated in the homelands of partitioned ethnicities. Moreover, these territories are intensely
contested among different conflict actors having a significantly higher likelihood of a change in territorial
control. These results are robust to different estimation techniques, alternative classifications of parti-
tioned ethnicities, accounting for ethnic family features, and more. We also show that the impact of
ethnic partitioning is especially strong in landlocked countries whereas the negative impact of partitioning
seems to be mitigated in countries with inclusive, democratic institutions. The uncovered differences in
the probability and intensity of civil conflict, battles and violence against civilians between partitioned
and non-split groups becomes more dramatic when viewed in light of the fact that these two groups were
socially, culturally, and economically similar in the eve of colonization. Our work thus suggests that the
scramble for Africa, by partitioning ethnicities in different countries, laid the seeds of a violent legacy of
civil conflict and political violence.
Our work suggests that future research may examine the impact of ethnic partitioning on other
aspects of economic and institutional development. Moreover, our study calls for future work to uncover the
exact mechanisms via which the Scramble for Africa has affected long-run economic performance. Finally,
since border artificiality and ethnic partitioning in particular are not an exclusive African phenomenon
subsequent works could also study their effect in other regions, such as the Middle East.
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7 Data Appendix
Partitioning Index (SPLIT): Indicator variable that equals 1 if at least 10% of the historical homeland
of an ethnic group is partitioned into different countries. We also construct and alternative partitioning
index that equals 1 if at least 5% of the historical homeland of an ethnic group is partitioned into different
countries. Source: Calculated intersecting Murdock’s (1959) ethnic map of Africa with the Digital Chart
of the World (DCW) shapefile. The latter contains the polygons delineating the international boundaries
in 2000. Appendix Table 1 reports partitioned ethnicities.
Continuous Measure of Partitioning (FRAC): The index reflects the probability that a square
kilometer of an ethnic area falls to a different country than the rest of the historical ethnic homeland.
Computed similarly to the Herfindahl index. Source: Calculated intersecting Murdock’s (1959) ethnic map
of Africa with the Digital Chart of the World (DCW) shapefile. The latter contains the polygons delineating
the international boundaries in 2000.
All Civil Conflict Incidents: Sum of all civil conflict incidents. There are 8 event types. (1)
Battles without change of control; (2) Battles where rebel groups gain control of the location; (3) Battles
where the government regains control of a location; (4) Headquarter of base establishments, where rebel
groups establish (via violent or non-violent means) their base; (5) Non-violent conflict events where rebel
groups, militias or government forces proceed in non-violent actions (without active fighting) that are
however within the context of an ongoing civil conflict and dispute (e.g., recruitment drives, incursions
or rallies); (6) Riots and protests; (7) Violence again civilians, where armed groups (rebels, militias or
government forces) attack unarmed civilians; (8) Non-Violent transfer of control. In the cross-sectional
specifications we aggregate the data at the ethnic homeland level and in the within-country specifications
we aggregate the data at the country-ethnic homeland level. See Section 2 for details. Source: ACLED.
Battles: Total number of battles between two violent armed groups at the ethnic homeland (in
each country for partitioned ethnicities). Battles include armed conflict where a control of the contested
location does not change and conflict events resulting in a territorial change of control. We aggregate the
data at the ethnic homeland level and at the country-ethnic homeland level. See Section 2 for details.
Source: ACLED.
Violence against Civilians: Total number of violent events against civilians at the ethnic home-
land (in each country for partitioned ethnicities). Violence against civilians occurs when any armed/violent
group attacks unarmed civilians. Rebels, governments, militias, rioters can all commit violence against
civilians. We aggregate the data at the ethnic homeland level and at the country-ethnic homeland level.
See Section 2 for details. Source: ACLED.
Territorial Change of Control: Indicator that takes on the value of one if a battle resulting in
change of territorial control takes place at the historical homeland on an ethnic group / country-ethnicity.
Source: ACLED.
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Pre-colonial Conflict: Using data on the centroid (latitude-longitude) of 91 major conflict inci-
dents in Africa in the pre-colonial period (between 1400 − 1700) we define a dummy variable that takes
on the value of one for ethnic homelands that experienced such a conflict in their territory, as defined by
Murdock’s map. Following Besley and Reynal-Querol we also use the distance of each ethnic homeland to
the centroid of the closest pre-colonial conflict. Source: Besley and Reynal-Querol (2012); original source:
Brecke (1999) and Cioffi-Revilla (1996).
Pre-colonial Kingdoms and Empires: We define a dummy variable that takes on the value of one
for ethnic homelands that were part of a large pre-colonial kingdom and empire. We also use the distance
of each ethnic homeland to the centroid of the closest pre-colonial kingdom/empire. Source: Besley and
Reynal-Querol (2012); original source: O’Brien (1999).
City in 1400: Indicator variable that takes on the value of one if a city with a population larger than
20, 000 in 1400 was in the historical homeland of an ethnic group and zero otherwise. Source: Chandler
(1987).
Distance to Explorer’s Routes: The geodesic distance of the centroid of each group to the
nearest route of the principal European explorers. Source: The "Century Atlas, Africa" digitized by Nunn
and Wantchekon (2011).
Population at Independence: Log of population as recorded in the first post-independence census
(in the 1960s for most countries). Source: UNESCO (1987).
Land Area: Log surface area of the historical homeland of each ethnic group in 1000s of sq. km.
Source: Global Mapping International, Colorado Springs, Colorado, USA.
Water Area: Log of one plus the total area of the historical homeland of each ethnic group covered
by rivers or lakes in sq. km. Source: Constructed using the "Inland water area features" dataset from
Global Mapping International, Colorado Springs, Colorado, USA.
Elevation: Average value (and standard deviation) of elevation in kilometers. Source: National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and U.S. National Geophysical Data Center, Terrain-
Base, release 1.0 (CD-ROM), Boulder, Colorado.
Land Suitability for Agriculture: Average value (and standard deviation) of land quality for
cultivation. The index is the product of two components reflecting the climatic and soil suitability for
cultivation. Source: Michalopoulos (2012); Original Source: Atlas of the Biosphere.
Malaria Stability Index: The index takes into account the prevalence and type of mosquitoes
indigenous to a region, their human biting rate, their daily survival rate, and their incubation period. The
index has been constructed for 0.5 degree by 0.5 degree grid-cells. We use the average value for each ethnic
homeland (and for each country-ethnic region). Source: Kiszewski, Mellinger, Spielman, Malaney, Sachs,
and Sachs (2004)
Distance to the National Border: The geodesic distance of the centroid of the historical home-
land of each ethnic group from the nearest national border, measured in 1000s of km’s. Source: Global
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Mapping International, Colorado Springs, Colorado, USA.
Distance to the Capital: The geodesic distance of the centroid of the historical homeland of each
ethnic group from the capital city, measured in 1000s of km’s. Source: Global Mapping International,
Colorado Springs, Colorado, USA.
Distance to the Sea: The geodesic distance of the centroid of the historical homeland of each
ethnic group from the nearest coastline, measured in 1000s of km’s. Source: Global Mapping International,
Colorado Springs, Colorado, USA.
Petroleum: Indicator variable that takes on the value of one if an on-shore oil field and gas deposit
is in the historical homeland of an ethnic group and zero otherwise. Source: The Petroleum Dataset v.1.1
Diamond: Indicator variable that takes on the value of one if a diamond mine is in the historical
homeland of an ethnic group and zero otherwise. Source: Map of Diamond Resources. PRIO.
Capital City Indicator: Dummy variable that takes on the value one when a capital city is located
in an ethnic historical homeland (in a country for partitioned ethnicities) and zero otherwise.
Latitude: Latitude of the centroid of each ethnic group, constructed using ArcGIS Software.
Longitude: Longitude of the centroid of each ethnic group, constructed using ArcGIS Software.
Regional Indicators: There are five regional indicator variables, North Africa, Western Africa,
Central Africa, Eastern Africa, and Southern Africa. Source: Nunn (2008).
Slavery: Number of persons of each ethnic group that were shipped during the trans-Atlantic and
Indian Ocean slave trades. Following Nunn (2008) in the regressions we use the log of one plus the number
of slaves per 1000 of square kilometers and a dummy variable that takes on the value of one for ethnic
groups that were affected by the slave trades (and zero otherwise). Source: Nunn (2008) and Nunn and
Wantchekon (2011).
Settlement Pattern: Ordered variable ranging from 0 to 7 quantifying "settlement pattern of
each group". 0 indicates fully nomadic (migratory) groups, 1 indicates semi-nomadic, 2 indicates semi-
sedentary, 3 identifies groups that live in compact and impermanent settlements, 4 indicates societies those
in neighborhoods of dispersed family homes, 5 indicates for groups in separated hamlets forming a single
community, 6 indicates societies living in compact and relatively permanent settlements, and 7 denotes the
groups residing in complex settlements. Source: Murdock (1967); variable code v30.
Political Centralization: The binary index is constructed using Murdock’s (1967) Jurisdictional
Hierarchy beyond Local Community 0−4 index that indicates the number of jurisdictional levels (political
complexity) in each society above the local level. The political centralization index takes the value 0 if the
Jurisdictional Hierarchy beyond Local Community variable equals 0 or 1 (when the society is classified as
either stateless or forming a small chiefdom). The index takes on the value 1 if the Jurisdictional Hierarchy
beyond Local Community variable equals 2, 3, and 4 (when the society is classified as being part of large
paramount chiefdom or a large state). This aggregation follows Gennaioli and Rainer (2006, 2007). Source:
Murdock (1967).
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Class Stratification: Ordered variable ranging from 0 to 4 quantifying "the degree of class differen-
tiation, excluding purely political and religious statuses". A zero score indicates "absence of significant class
distinctions among freemen, ignoring variations in individual repute achieved through skill, valor, piety, or
wisdom." A score of 1 indicates "the presence of wealth distinctions, based on possession or distribution
of property, which however have not crystallized into distinct and hereditary social classes." A score of
2 indicates "elite stratification in which an elite class derives its superior status from control over scarce
resources, particularly land, and is thereby differentiated from a propertyless proletariat or serf class". A
score of 3 indicates a "dual stratification into a hereditary aristocracy and a lower class of ordinary com-
moners or freemen, where traditionally ascribed noble status is at least as decisive as control over scarce
resources. A score of 4 indicates "complex stratification into social classes correlated in large measure with
extensive differentiation of occupational statuses." Source: Murdock (1967); variable code v67.
Dependence on Agriculture: 0−9 scale index reflecting the intensity of agriculture. "It includes
penetration of the soil, planting, tending the growing crops, and harvesting but not subsequent food
preparation". The index equals 0 when there 0%-5% dependence; 1 when there is 6%-15% dependence;
2 when there is 16%-25% dependence; 3 when there is 26%-35% dependence; 4 when there is 36%-45%
dependence; 5 when there is 46%-55% dependence; 6 when there is 56%-65% dependence; 7 when there is
66%-75% dependence; 8 when there is 76%-85% dependence; and 9 when there is 86%-100% dependence.
Source: Murdock (1967); variable code v5.
Gathering: Binary index that indicates the reliance of the economy on "the collection of wild plans
and small land fauna." The index equals zero when the dependence is between 0% and 5%; the index
equals one when dependence is greater than 5% dependence. Source: Murdock (1967); variable code v1.
Hunting: Binary index that indicates the intensity in hunting (including trapping and fowling).
The index equals zero when the dependence is between 0% and 5%; the index equals one when dependence
is greater than 5%. Source: Murdock (1967); variable code v2.
Fishing: Binary index that indicates the intensity in fishing (including shell fishing and the pursuit
of large aquatic animals). The index equals zero when the dependence is between 0% and 5%; the index
equals one when dependence is greater than 5%. Source: Murdock (1967); variable code v3.
Milking: Binary index that equals zero when "domestic animals are milked more often that spo-
radically" and zero when "little or no milking". Source: Murdock (1967); variable code v41.
Agriculture Type: 0− 4 scale index reflecting the type of agriculture. The index equals 0 when
there is "no agriculture"; 1 when there is "causal agriculture"; 2 when there is "extensive or shifting
agriculture"; 3 when there is "intensive agriculture"; and 4 when there is "intensive irrigated agriculture."
Source: Murdock (1967); variable code v28.
Polygyny: Indicator that equals one when polygyny is practised and zero otherwise. The indicator
equals one when the original variable indicates that polygyny is common and when large extended families
are present. Source: Murdock (1967); variable code v8.
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Binary Class Stratification: The dummy stratification index equals zero when Murdock’s vari-
able equals zero indicating "absence of significant class distinctions among freemen, ignoring variations in
individual repute achieved through skill, valor, piety, or wisdom," and one when Murdock’s class stratifi-
cation measure equals 1, 2, 3, or 4. The construction of this variable follows Gennaioli and Rainer (2006,
2007). Source: Murdock (1967); variable code v67.
Clan Communities: Indicator that equals one when Murdock’s community marriage organization
variable (v15) equals 6 ("clan communities or clan barrios") and zero otherwise. Source: Murdock (1967);
variable code v15.
Complex Settlements: Indicator that equals one for ethnicities living in compact and relatively
permanent settlements (v30=7) or in complex settlements (v30=8), and zero otherwise. Source: Murdock
(1967); variable code v30.
Jurisdictional Hierarchy of Local Community: Ordered variable ranging from 0 to 2 reflecting
the hierarchy of local community organization. A zero score indicates the theoretical minimum of two (e.g.„
family and band), while a score of 2 indicates the theoretical maximum of four levels (e.g.„ nuclear family,
extended family, clan barrio, village levels). Source: Murdock (1967); variable code v32.
Elections: Indicator that equals 1 when succession to the office of the local headman is conducted
via "election or other formal consensus, nonhereditary" and zero otherwise. Source: Murdock (1967);
variable code v72.
Inheritance Rule for Property: Indicator that equals one when some form of inheritance rule
of real property (land) is present; the binary indicator equals zero when there is "absence of individual
property rights". Source: Murdock (1967); variable code v74.
Land Area: Log surface area. Source: Nunn and Puga (2012).
Income level: Log of per capita GDP at PPP (Chain Index) in 2000 and in 1961. Source: Penn
World Tables, Edition 7. Heston, Summers, and Aten (2011).
Rule of Law: The rule of law index is "capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, prop-
erty rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence." The standardized
index, which corresponds in 2000, ranges from −2.5 to +2.5 with higher values indicating better function-
ing institutions. Source: World Bank Governance Matters Indicators Database (Kaufmann, Kraay, and
Mastruzzi (2005)).
Ethnic/Linguistic/Religious Fractionalization: Index of ethnic/linguistic/religious heterogene-
ity, constructed as one minus the Herfindahl index of the share of the largest groups. It reflects the prob-
ability that two randomly selected individuals follow different ethnolinguistic/religious groups. Source:
Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003).
Ethnolinguistic Polarization: Index of ethnolinguistic polarization that achieves a maximum
score when a country is occupied by two groups of the same population. Source: Montalvo and Reynal-
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Querol (2005).
Ethnic Segregation: Index ranging from zero to one capturing ethnic/linguistic/religious segrega-
tion (clustering) within countries. If each region is comprised of a separate group, then the index is equal
to 1, and this is the case of full segregation. If every region has the same fraction of each group as the
country as a whole, the index is equal to 0, this is the case of no segregation. The index is increasing in
the square deviation of regional-level fractions of groups relative to the national average. The index gives
higher weight to the deviation of group composition from the national average in bigger regions than in
smaller regions. Source: Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011).
Cultural Heterogeneity: Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization that accounts for the degree
of similarity between linguistic groups using the Ethnologue linguistic tree. Source: Fearon (2003).
Democracy: Binary index of political regime (autocracy and democracy), based on the conduct
of contested elections in 2000. Source: Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000); updated series
available: http://politics.as.nyu.edu/object/przeworskilinks.html.
Democratic Capital: Index reflecting the stock of democratic capital in 2000. Democratic capital
is build in years of democracy and depreciates geometrically in years of autocracy. We use the index that
is constructed assuming a depreciation rate of 0.99. Source: Persson and Tabellini (2009); Source: Polity
IV Project (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gur (2011)).
Executive Constraints at Independence: Standardized (ranging from 0-1) index that reflects
the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether
individuals or collectivities, in the initial ten years since independence. The construction of the index
follows Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2008). Source: Polity IV Project (Marshall, Jaggers,
and Gur (2011)).
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Indicator 
Likelihood
mean mean median mean median mean median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All Types of Conflict Events
  all ethnic homelands (N=826) 0.762 52.386 4.000 35.202 4.000 36.584 4.000
  non-partitioned ethnic groups (N=596) 0.732 47.616 3.000 30.495 3.000 30.460 3.000
  partitioned ethnic groups (N=230) 0.839 64.748 13.000 47.872 10.000 52.297 13.000
  difference 0.11 17.13 10.00 17.38 7.00 21.84 10.00
  difference (p-value) (0.00) (0.28) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Battles
  all ethnic homelands (N=826) 0.593 22.645 1.000 16.781 1.000 14.920 1.000
  non-partitioned ethnic groups (N=596) 0.577 19.837 1.000 14.551 1.000 13.074 1.000
  partitioned ethnic groups (N=230) 0.635 29.926 2.500 22.787 2.000 21.123 2.000
  difference 0.06 10.09 1.50 8.24 1.00 8.05 1.00
  difference (p-value) (0.13) (0.20) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Battles with Change in Territory
  all ethnic homelands (N=826) 0.265 2.810 0.000 2.460 0.000 2.096 0.000
  non-partitioned ethnic groups (N=596) 0.227 2.183 0.000 1.752 0.000 1.558 0.000
  partitioned ethnic groups (N=230) 0.365 4.448 0.000 4.355 0.000 3.498 0.000
  difference 0.14 2.26 0.00 2.60 0.00 1.94 0.00
  difference (p-value) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Violence against Civilians
  all ethnic homelands (N=826) 0.608 19.180 1.000 12.196 1.000 12.227 1.000
  non-partitioned ethnic groups (N=596) 0.572 17.648 1.000 10.502 1.000 10.381 1.000
  partitioned ethnic groups (N=230) 0.700 23.157 3.000 16.758 2.000 17.004 3.000
  difference 0.13 5.51 2.00 6.26 1.00 6.62 2.00
  difference (p-value) (0.00) (0.43) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Table 1: Test of Means and Medians for Main Civil Conflict Measures
Number of Incidents
Excluding 
Capitals
Excluding 
Outliers (top 1%)
Panel A: All Ethnic Homelands
Indicator 
Likelihood
mean mean median mean median mean median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All Types of Conflict Events
  all ethnic homelands (N=413) 0.741 49.660 4.000 38.280 3.000 36.643 4.000
  non-partitioned ethnic groups (N=200) 0.645 32.300 1.000 29.270 1.000 24.704 1.000
  partitioned ethnic groups (N=213) 0.831 65.967 12.000 47.249 10.000 47.957 12.000
  difference 0.19 33.67 11.00 17.98 9.00 23.25 11.00
  difference (p-value) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Battles
  all ethnic homelands (N=413) 0.545 23.194 1.000 18.031 1.000 16.186 1.000
  non-partitioned ethnic groups (N=200) 0.465 15.700 0.000 13.867 0.000 11.402 0.000
  partitioned ethnic groups (N=213) 0.620 30.235 3.000 22.178 2.000 20.724 2.500
  difference 0.15 14.53 3.00 8.31 2.00 9.32 2.50
  difference (p-value) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.17) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Battles with Change in Territory
  all ethnic homelands (N=413) 0.266 3.281 0.000 2.911 0.000 2.496 0.000
  non-partitioned ethnic groups (N=200) 0.170 2.135 0.000 1.633 0.000 1.303 0.000
  partitioned ethnic groups (N=213) 0.357 4.357 0.000 4.183 0.000 3.616 0.000
  difference 0.19 2.22 0.00 2.55 0.00 2.31 0.00
  difference (p-value) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Violent Indcidents
  all ethnic homelands 0.574 17.910 1.000 13.860 1.000 12.616 1.000
  non-partitioned ethnic groups 0.450 11.390 0.000 10.786 0.000 7.525 0.000
  partitioned ethnic groups 0.690 24.033 3.000 16.919 2.000 17.393 3.000
  difference 0.24 12.64 3.00 6.13 2.00 9.87 3.00
  difference (p-value) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
The table reports summary statistics and test of means and medians for the ACLED civil conflict (outcome) variables employed in the 
empirical analysis at the ethnic homeland level. Panel A reports test of means/medians at the full sample. Panel B reports test of 
means/medians across ethnic homelands close to the national border (using as a cutoff the median distance from the centroid of each ethnic 
homeland to the national border; 102 kilometers). Column (1) reports the likelihood that a conflict (all conflict incidents, battles, battles 
resulting in a territorial change, and violence against the civilian population) affects an ethnic homeland. Columns (2)-(3) report the mean 
and the median value for each type of conflict, respectively. Columns (4)-(5) report the mean and the median value for each type of conflict 
excluding ethnic regions where capital cities fall. Columns (6)-(7) report the mean and the median value for each type of conflict excluding 
ethnic regions where the respective variable exceeds the 99th percentile. For each variable the table reports the mean/median value using 
all ethnic homelands, partitioned ethnicities and non-partitioned ethnicities. The table also reports the mean and median difference and the 
p-value of mean-median equality between the group of partitioned and non-partitioned ethnicities. The Data Appendix gives detailed 
variable definitions and data sources.
Table 1: Test of Means and Medians for Main Civil Conflict Measures
Panel B: Ethnic Homelands close to the National Border
Number of Incidents
Excluding 
Capitals
Excluding 
Outliers
SPLIT FRAC SPLIT FRAC SPLIT FRAC SPLIT FRAC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Land Area under Water 0.3219*** 0.0613*** 0.3891*** 0.0683*** 0.3449*** 0.0670*** 0.3352*** 0.0623***
 (0.0955)  (0.0125)  (0.1012)  (0.0117)  (0.0953)  (0.0122)  (0.0998)  (0.0134)
Land Area 0.0869 0.0149* 0.1051* 0.0171** 0.0938 0.0167** 0.0697 0.0131*  
 (0.0567)  (0.0080)  (0.0600)  (0.0086)  (0.0583)  (0.0084)  (0.0542)  (0.0071)
Elevation -0.0623 -0.0209                
 (0.1834)  (0.0293)                              
St. Dev. Elevation -0.0001 0.0000                
(0.0006) (0.0001)                
              
Suitability for Agriculture 0.4494 0.0621                
 (0.3328)  (0.0491)                
              
St. Dev. Suit. Agricult. 0.8556 0.0672                
(0.7386) (0.0859)                
Malaria Stability Index 0.1250 0.0292                
 (0.2297)  (0.0409)                
              
Distance to the Coast -0.0001 0.0000                
 (0.0002) (0.0000)                
              
Diamond Mine Indicator 0.1626 0.018
 (0.1802)  (0.0287)
Oil Indicator 0.0081 0.0026
 (0.1696)  (0.0351)
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.050 __ 0.057 __ 0.051 __ 0.051 __
Adjusted R-squared __ 0.082 __ 0.090 __ 0.089 __ 0.083
Observations 826 826 826 826 826 826 826 826
Panel A: Geographical, Ecological and Natural Resources Features
Table 2 - Panel A reports probit marginal effects (in odd-numbered columns) and OLS estimates (in even-numbered columns) associating 
ethnic partitioning with geographical, ecological and natural resource variables. In odd-numbered specifications, the dependent variable is an 
indicator that equals one when at least 10% of the historical ethnic homeland (as portrayed in Murdock’s (1959) Ethnolinguistic map) falls to 
more than one contemporary countries. In even-numbered columns, the dependent variable is a continuous index of ethnic partitioning that 
reflects the probability that a randomly chosen pixel of the historical homeland of an ethnic group falls into a different country. All 
specifications include a set of region fixed effects (constants not reported). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data 
sources. Standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for double clustering at the country-dimension and the ethno-linguistic family 
dimension.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 2  - Border Artificiality 
ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS
SPLIT FRAC SPLIT FRAC SPLIT FRAC SPLIT FRAC
(1) (3) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-colonial Conflict Indicator -0.2320 -0.0386
(0.2531)  (0.0264)
Distance to Pre-colonial Conflict -0.1414 -0.0290
(0.2044) (0.0321)
Slave Trades Indicator 0.0410 0.0061
(0.1131) (0.0162)
Log Number of Slaves 0.0225 0.0079
  (normalized by land area)  (0.0244) (0.0080)
Land Area under Water 0.3282*** 0.0621*** 0.3217*** 0.0611*** 0.3246*** 0.0616*** 0.3298*** 0.1194***
 (0.0937)  (0.0125) (0.0972)  (0.0130)  (0.0963)  (0.0126)  (0.0957)  (0.0250)
Land Area 0.0934 0.0160* 0.0883 0.0151* 0.084 0.0144* 0.0835 0.0264
(0.0157)  (0.0084)  (0.0560)  (0.0080)  (0.0559)  (0.0080)  (0.0559)  (0.0162)
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.051 __ 0.05 __ 0.05 __ 0.051 __
Adjusted R-squared __ 0.075 __ 0.085 __ 0.083 __ 0.064
Observations 826 826 826 826 826 826 826 826
Table 2  - Border Artificiality 
Panel B: Pre-colonial Conflict
Table 2 - Panel B reports probit marginal effects (in odd-numbered columns) and OLS estimates (in even-numbered columns) associating 
ethnic partitioning with proxy measures of pre-colonial conflict.  In odd-numbered specifications, the dependent variable is an indicator that 
equals one when at least 10% of the historical ethnic homeland (as portrayed in Murdock’s (1959) Ethnolinguistic map) falls to more than one 
contemporary countries. In even-numbered columns, the dependent variable is a continuous index of ethnic partitioning that reflects the 
probability that a randomly chosen pixel of the historical homeland of an ethnic group falls into a different country. All specifications include 
a set of region fixed effects (constants not reported).  In columns (1)-(4) we use data on pre-colonial conflict (in the period 1400-1700) from 
Besley and Reynal-Querol (2012) and Brecke (1999). In columns (5)-(8) we use data on enslavement during the African slave trades from 
Nunn (2008) and Nunn and Watcekon (2011). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. Standard errors 
reported in parentheses are adjusted for double clustering at the country-dimension and the ethno-linguistic family dimension.  ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS ML OLS
SPLIT FRAC SPLIT FRAC SPLIT FRAC SPLIT FRAC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-colonial Kingdom Indicato 0.1233 0.0178                
 (0.1317)  (0.0193)                
               
Distance to Pre-colonial Kingdom -0.0043 -0.0092
 (0.3176)  (0.0409)
Major City in 1400AD 0.0547 -0.0042
 (0.2080)  (0.0344)
Distance to Explorer's Routes -0.0004 0.0000
 (0.0003) (0.0000)
Land Area under Water 0.3053*** 0.0590*** 0.3217*** 0.0608*** 0.3210*** 0.0613*** 0.3162*** 0.0605***
 (0.0988)  (0.0126) (0.0949)  (0.0120) (0.0959) (0.0124)  (0.0980) (0.0130)
Land Area 0.0788 0.0135 0.0868 0.0147* 0.0858 0.0149* 0.0817 0.0142*
 (0.0582)  (0.0086)  (0.0580)  (0.0085)  (0.0564)  (0.0079)  (0.0571)  (0.0081)
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.051 __ 0.05 __ 0.050 __ 0.053 __
Adjusted R-squared __ 0.084 __ 0.083 __ 0.082 __ 0.085
Observations 826 826 826 826 826 826 826 826
Table 2 - Panel C reports probit marginal effects (in odd-numbered columns) and OLS estimates (in even-numbered columns) associating 
ethnic partitioning with geographical, ecological and natural resource variables. In odd-numbered specifications, the dependent variable is an 
indicator that equals one when at least 10% of the historical ethnic homeland (as portrayed in Murdock’s (1959) Ethnolinguistic map) falls to 
more than one contemporary countries. In even-numbered columns, the dependent variable is a continuous index of ethnic partitioning that 
reflects the probability that a randomly chosen pixel of the historical homeland of an ethnic group falls into a different country. All 
specifications include a set of region fixed effects (constants not reported). Data on pre-colonial statehood (large kingdoms and empires) are 
taken from Besley and Reynal-Querol (2012) and O' Brian (1999). Data on major cities before the slave trades (in 1400) come from Chandler 
(1987). Data on the pincipal European explorer's routes come from Nunn (2009). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and 
data sources. Standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for double clustering at the country-dimension and the ethno-linguistic 
family dimension.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 2  - Border Artificiality 
Panel C: Pre-colonial Statehood & Development 
SPLIT FRAC SPLIT FRAC SPLIT FRAC SPLIT FRAC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Land Area under Water 0.2829** 0.0514*** 0.2528** 0.0475*** 0.3372*** 0.0613*** 0.2928** 0.0558***
 (0.1183)  (0.0162)  (0.1155)  (0.0159)  (0.1109)  (0.0163)  (0.1176)  (0.0162)
Land Area 0.1569** 0.0252*** 0.1628** 0.0257*** 0.1727** 0.0238** 0.1677** 0.0254***
 (0.0731)  (0.0090)  (0.0721)  (0.0094)  (0.0797)  (0.0097)  (0.0676)  (0.0084)
Settlement Patterns 0.0203 0.0038
 (0.0411)  (0.0055)
Share of Agriculture 0.0322 0.0048
 (0.0297)  (0.0055)
Political Centralization -0.1965 -0.0321
 (0.1354)  (0.0208)
Class Stratification -0.0242 -0.0038
 (0.0569)  (0.0069)
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.068 __ 0.068 __ 0.085 __ 0.068 __
adjusted R-squared __ 0.105 __ 0.106 __ 0.128 __ 0.107
Observations 451 451 437 437 394 394 487 487
Table 3  - Ethnic Partitioning as a Function of Economic, Social, Cultural, and Political Ethnic Traits
Table 3- Panel A reports probit marginal effects (in odd-numbered columns) and OLS estimates (in even-numbered columns) associating 
ethnic partitioning with pre-colonial ethnic variables (using data from Murdock (1967)) reflecting early economic and political 
development. In odd-numbered specifications, the dependent variable is an indicator that equals one when at least 10% of the historical 
ethnic homeland (as portrayed in Murdock’s (1959) Ethnolinguistic map) falls to more than one contemporary country. In even-
numbered columns, the dependent variable is a continuous index of ethnic partitioning that reflects the probability that a randomly 
chosen pixel of the historical homeland of an ethnic group falls into a different country. All specifications include a set of region fixed 
effects (constants not reported). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. Standard errors reported in 
parentheses are adjusted for double clustering at the country-dimension and the ethno-linguistic family dimension. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Using Data from Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas
Panel A: Baseline Estimates. Pre-colonial Economic & Political Development 
Additional Variable Obs. Additional Variable Obs.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gathering 0.0128 487 -0.0682 487
 (0.0524)  (0.0486)
Hunting 0.0415 487 0.0388 487
 (0.0483)  (0.0452)
Fishing 0.0234 487 -0.004 487
 (0.0556)  (0.0518)
Milking -0.0116 452 0.0118 452
 (0.0552)  (0.0377)
Alternative Argiculture Dep. -0.0381 452 -0.0231 452
-0.0283 -0.0322
Polygyny -0.0174 478 -0.0051 478
 (0.0453)  (0.0503)
Clan Communities 0.0197 396 0.0385 396
 (0.0609)  (0.0614)
Complex Settlements 0.0209 451 0.017 451
 (0.0607)  (0.0528)
Binary Class Stratification -0.0158 394 -0.0754 394
 (0.0495)  (0.0457)
Jurisdictional Hierarchy 0.0221 440 0.0061 440
 of Local Community -0.0395 -0.0319
Elections -0.0663 344 -0.0542 344
 (0.0822)  (0.0903)
Inheritance Rule for Property -0.0821 374 0.0211 374
 (0.0927)  (0.0898)
Table 3  - Ethnic Partitioning as a Function of Economic, Social, Cultural, and Political Ethnic Traits
Specification A 
Unconditional Relationship
Specification B
 Conditional Relationship
Table 3-Panel B reports OLS (linear probability model) estimates associating ethnic partitioning with pre-colonial ethnic-specific 
variables (using data from Murdock (1967)). In all specifications the dependent variable is an indicator that equals one when at least 
10% of the historical ethnic homeland (as portrayed in Murdock’s (1959) Ethnolinguistic map) falls to more than one contemporary 
country. Specifications A are simple unconditional models. Specifications B include a set of region fixed effects (constants not 
reported), log land area under water, and log land area. Standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for double clustering at the 
country-dimension and the ethno-linguistic family dimension. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively.
Using Data from Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas
Panel B: Further Evidence
Log Land 
Area
Log  Area 
under Water
Mean 
Elevation
Land 
Suitability
Malaria 
Stability
Distance to 
the Sea
Diamond 
Indicator
Petroleum 
Indicator
Major City 
in 1400
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
SPLIT (Partitioning) -0.1748 -0.0190 0.0179 0.0001 -0.0091 0.0203 -0.0216 -0.0126 -0.0003
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.1092)  (0.0255)  (0.0369)  (0.0194)  (0.0221)  (0.0324)  (0.0224)  (0.0190)  (0.0097)
adjusted R-squared 0.223 0.255 0.575 0.418 0.640 0.620 0.340 0.187 0.063
Mean Dependent Variable 2.0620 0.2706 0.6168 0.4079 0.7209 0.6042 0.0854 0.0947 0.0270
Observations 1182 1182 1182 1182 1182 1182 1182 1182 1182
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 4: Ethnic Partitioning and Geographic Characteristics within Countries
Dependent variable is: 
The table reports OLS estimates associating various geographical, ecological, and natural resource characteristics with ethnic partitioning within countries. The unit of analysis is 
an ethnic territory in a country (ethnicity-country). SPLIT is an indicator variable that identifies partitioned ethnicities as those with at least 10% of the historical homeland 
falling into more than one contemporary country. All specifications include country fixed effects (constants not reported). The dependent variable in column (1) is the log of a 
country-ethnicity’s region surface area; in column (2) is the log of (1 + surface area under water); column (3) is average elevation; in column (4) is an index capturing land's 
suitability (quality) for agriculture; in column (5) is the average value of a malaria stability index; in columns (6) is the distance of the centroid of each country-ethnic region to 
the nearest sea coast; in column (7) is a binary index that takes on the value of one if a diamond mine is present; in column (8) is a binary index that takes on the value of one if 
an oil/petroleum field is present; and in column (9) a binary index that takes on the value of one if a major city was present before European’s arrival in Africa (in 1400). The 
Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. The table reports in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the country and the ethno-linguistic 
family dimensions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Excl. 
Outliers
Excl. 
Capitals
Excl. 
Outliers
Excl. 
Capitals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
SPLIT (Partitioning) 0.7590*** 0.7250*** 0.6740*** 0.6207*** 0.7093*** 0.6813*** 0.7076*** 0.7136*** 0.9580*** 0.8492** 0.9430*** 0.8812** 
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.2928)  (0.2735)  (0.2338)  (0.2234)  (0.2150)  (0.2317)  (0.2473)  (0.1798)  (0.2979)  (0.3316)  (0.2970)  (0.3608)
Log Likelihood -3221.79 -3204.03 -3159.39 -3151.76 -3095.09 -2847.00 -1593.4 -1578.59 -1560.3 -1552.09 -1498.35 -1422.98
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 826 826 826 826 821 779 413 413 413 413 408 393
The table reports Negative Binomial Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates, associating civil conflict incidents with ethnic partitioning at the ethnic homeland level. The 
dependent variable is the total number of civil conflict incidents at each ethnic homeland over the period 1997-2010. SPLIT is an indicator variable that identifies partitioned 
ethnicities as those with at least 10% of the historical homeland falling into more than one contemporary country. The specifications in columns (2)-(6) and (7)-(12) include a set 
of region fixed effects (constants not reported). The set of simple controls includes the log of land area, the log of (1 + land area under water) (lakes, rivers, and other streams), 
and the log of population approximately in 1960. The set of location controls includes the distance of the centroid of each ethnic homeland from the capital, from the sea coast, 
from the national border, and an indicator that takes on the value one if a capital city falls in the historical homeland. The set of geographic controls includes an index of land 
suitability for agriculture, mean elevation, a malaria stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. The specifications in columns (5) and (11) exclude 
ethnic homelands where the dependent variable exceeds the 99th percentile. The specifications in columns (6) and (12) exclude ethnic homelands where capital cities fall. The 
specifications in columns (7)-(12) focus on ethnic areas close to the national border (using as a cutoff the median distance from the centroid of each ethnic homeland to the 
national border; 102 kilometers). The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. The table reports in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the 
country and the ethno-linguistic family dimensions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 5: Ethnic Partitioning and Civil Conflict
Cross-Sectional Estimates
All Ethnic Homelands Ethnic Homelands Close to the National Border
All Observations All Observations
Excl. 
Outliers
Excl. 
Capitals
Excl. 
Outliers
Excl. 
Capitals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
SPLIT (Partitioning) 0.4929*** 0.4748*** 0.6731*** 0.6185*** 0.6284*** 0.6171*** 1.0208*** 0.8465*** 0.9258*** 0.8502*** 0.8502*** 0.8388***
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.1559)  (0.2073)  (0.1977)  (0.1876)  (0.1876)  (0.1829)  (0.1767)  (0.3061)  (0.3143)  (0.3145)  (0.3140)  (0.3154)
Log Likelihood -3942.45 -3708.6 -3615.94 -3603.19 -3498.16 -3340.02 -1556.06 -1419.28 -1393.15 -1384.94 -1377.37 -1322.22
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1182 1182 1182 1182 1170 1139 576 576 576 576 575 565
The table reports Negative Binomial Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates, associating civil conflict incidents with ethnic partitioning at the country-ethnicity homeland level. 
The dependent variable is the total number of civil conflict incidents at each ethnic homeland within a country over the period 1997-2010. SPLIT is an indicator variable that 
identifies partitioned ethnicities as those with at least 10% of the historical homeland falling into more than one contemporary country. The specifications in columns (2)-(6) and 
(7)-(12) include country fixed effects (constants not reported). The specifications in columns (7)-(12) focus on country-ethnicity areas close to the national border (using as a 
cutoff the median distance from the centroid of each ethnicity-country homeland to the national border; 62 kilometers). The specifications in columns (5) and (11) exclude 
country-ethnic homelands where the dependent variable exceeds the 99th percentile. The specifications in columns (6) and (12) exclude country-ethnic homelands where capital 
cities fall. The set of simple controls includes the log of land area, the log of (1 + land area under water) (lakes, rivers, and other streams), and the log of population in 1960. The 
set of location controls includes the distance of the centroid of each country-ethnic homeland from the respective capital, from the sea coast, from the national border, and an 
indicator that takes on the value of one if a capital city falls in the homeland of an ethnic group within a country. The set of geographic controls includes an index of land 
suitability for agriculture, mean elevation, a malaria stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions 
and data sources. The table reports in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the country and the ethno-linguistic family dimensions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 6: Ethnic Partitioning and Civil Conflict
Country-Fixed-Effects Estimates
All Ethnicity-Country Homelands Ethnicity-Country Homelands Close to the National Border
All Observations All Observations
All Obs
No 
Capitals All Obs
No 
Capitals All Obs
No 
Capitals All Obs
No 
Capitals All Obs
No 
Capitals All Obs
No 
Capitals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
SPLIT (Partitioning) 0.6051*** 0.5909*** 0.4943*** 0.5029*** 0.0376* 0.0396* 0.8442*** 0.8500*** 0.8895*** 0.8937*** 0.0507* 0.0502*
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.1420)  (0.1426)  (0.1621)  (0.1743)  (0.0199)  (0.0209)  (0.2510)  (0.2537)  (0.2439)  (0.2488)  (0.0280)  (0.0293)
Log Likelihood -2630.41 -2432.38 -2502.75 -2299.75 __ __ -995.072 -946.214 -938.915 -891.698 __ __
Adjusted R-squared __ __ __ __ 0.455 0.446 __ __ __ __ 0.466 0.457
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1182 1139 1182 1139 1182 1139 576 565 576 565 590 565
The table reports Negative Binomial Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates (in columns (1)-(4) and (7)-(10) and linear probability (LS) estimates associating various aspects of 
civil conflict with ethnic partitioning at the country-ethnic homeland level. The dependent variable in columns (1), (2), (7) and (8) is the total number of battles between 
government forces, rebel groups, and militias; the dependent variable in columns (3), (4), (9), and (10) is the number of violent events against civilian populations. The 
dependent variable in columns (5), (6), (11) and (12) is a dummy variable that equals one if a battle resulting in territorial change of control has taken place and zero otherwise. 
All specifications include country fixed effects (constants not reported). The specifications in columns (7)-(12) focus on ethnicity-country areas close to the national border 
(using as a cutoff the median distance from the centroid of each ethnic homeland within a country to the national border; 62 kilometers). The specifications in even-numbered 
columns exclude country-ethnic homelands where capital cities fall. The set of simple controls includes the log of land area, the log of (1 + land area under water) (lakes, rivers, 
and other streams), and the log of population in 1960. The set of location controls includes the distance of the centroid of each country-ethnic homeland from the respective 
capital, from the sea coast, from the national border, and an indicator that takes on the value of one if a capital city falls in the homeland of an ethnic group within a country. The 
set of geographic controls includes an index of land suitability for agriculture, mean elevation, a malaria stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. The 
Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. The table reports in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the country and the ethno-linguistic 
family dimensions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Territorial Change
Table 7: Ethnic Partitioning and Civil Conflict
Country Fixed Effects Estimates with Various Measures of Civil Conflict
All Ethnicity-Country Homelands Ethnicity-Country Homelands Close to the National Border
Battles Violence Territorial Change Battles Violence
All Obs
No 
Capitals
No 
Outliers All Obs All Obs All Obs No Capitals No Outliers All Obs All Obs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
SPLIT (Partitioning) 0.1912** 0.1984** 0.1869** 0.0824*** 0.0993*** 0.3087*** 0.3131*** 0.3281*** 0.0801* 0.1016*  
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.0953)  (0.0916)  (0.0908)  (0.0314)  (0.0336)  (0.1179)  (0.1158)  (0.1197)  (0.0459)  (0.0553)
Adjusted R-squared 0.617 0.593 0.576 0.439 0.447 0.603 0.595 0.574 0.465 0.451
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1182 1170 1139 1182 1182 590 575 565 576 576
Table 8: Ethnic Partitioning and Civil Conflict
OLS Specifications 
All Ethnicity-Country Homelands All Ethnicity-Country Homelands Close to the National Border
The table reports OLS estimates, associating civil conflict incidents with ethnic partitioning at the country-ethnicity level. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) and (6)-(9) 
is the log of one plus the total number of civil conflict incidents in an ethnic region within a country over the period 1997-2010. The dependent variable in columns (4) and (8) is 
a dummy variable that takes on the value of zero if no conflict has taken place during 1997-2010. The dependent variable in columns (5) and (10) is an indicator that equals zero 
if there have been at most two conflict incidents (2 is the median value of all conflict incidents over the 1997-2010) in an ethnicity-country. The specifications in columns (6)-
(10) focus on country-ethnicity areas close to the national border (using as a cutoff the median distance from the centroid of each ethnicity-country to the national border; 62 
kilometers). The specifications in columns (2) and (7) exclude country-ethnic homelands where the dependent variable exceeds the 99th percentile. The specifications in columns 
(3) and (8) exclude country-ethnic homelands where capital cities fall. All specifications include country fixed effects (constants not reported). The set of simple controls 
includes the log of land area, the log of (1 + land area under water) (lakes, rivers, and other streams), and the log of population in 1960. The set of location controls includes the 
distance of the centroid of each country-ethnic homeland from the respective capital, from the sea coast, from the national border, and an indicator that takes on the value of one 
if a capital city falls in the homeland of an ethnic group within a country. The set of geographic controls includes an index of land suitability for agriculture, mean elevation, a 
malaria stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. The table reports in 
parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the country and the ethno-linguistic family dimensions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively.
OLS 
ln(1+All Civil Conflict Events)
OLS
Linear Probabily 
OLS 
ln(1+All Civil Conflict Events)
OLS
Linear Probabily 
All Obs
No 
Capitals All Obs
No 
Capitals All Obs
No 
Capitals All Obs No Capitals All Obs
No 
Capitals All Obs
No 
Capitals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
SPLIT (Partitioning) 0.6298*** 0.6182*** 0.7750** 0.7692** 0.5568*** 0.5562** 0.7434** 0.7200* 0.5354** 0.5110** 0.6207* 0.5770*
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.1923)  (0.1941)  (0.3046)  (0.3068)  (0.2182)  (0.2335)  (0.3792)  (0.3814)  (0.1984)  (0.2074)  (0.3346)  (0.3335)
Log Likelihood -3582 -3317.33 -1354.67 -1293.51 -3467.48 -3209.94 -1279.21 -1219.501 -3451.45 -3195.16 -1269.921 -1210.46
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1182 1139 576 565 1182 1139 576 565 1182 1139 576 565
The table reports Negative Binomial Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates, associating civil conflict incidents with ethnic partitioning at the country-ethnic homeland level. The 
dependent variable is the total number of civil conflict incidents in each ethnic homeland in each country over the period 1997-2010. SPLIT is an indicator variable that identifies 
partitioned ethnicities as those with at least 10% of the historical homeland falling into more than one contemporary country. All specifications include country fixed effects (constants 
not reported).  The specifications in columns (3), (4), (7), (8), (11), and (12) focus on areas close to the national border (using as a cutoff the median distance from the centroid of each 
country-ethnic homeland to the national border; 62 kilometers). The specifications in even-numbered columns exclude country-ethnic homelands where capital cities fall. The 
specifications in (1)-(4) and (9)-(12) include a cubic polynomial in latitude and longitude. The specifications in (5)-(12) include a set of ethnic family fixed effects (constants not 
reported). The set of simple controls includes the log of land area, the log of (1 + land area under water) (lakes, rivers, and other streams), and the log of population in 1960. The set of 
location controls includes the distance of the centroid of each country-ethnic homeland from the respective capital, from the sea coast, from the national border, and an indicator that 
takes on the value of one if a capital city falls in the homeland of an ethnic group within a country. The set of geographic controls includes an index of land suitability for agriculture, 
mean elevation, a malaria stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. The table reports 
in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the country and the ethno-linguistic family dimensions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.
Table 9A: Ethnic Partitioning and Civil Conflict
Sensitivity Analysis. Accounting for Unobservables
Latitude-Longitude Polynomial Ethnic Family Fixed Effects
Latitude-Longitude Polynomial 
& Ethnic Family Fixed Effects
Border Areas
All Ethnicity-Country 
Areas Border Areas
All Ethnicity-Country 
Areas Border Areas
All Ethnicity-Country 
Areas
All Border All Border All Border All Border All Border
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
SPLIT (Partitioning) 0.5593* 0.7990* 0.6595*** 0.8090** 0.5548*** 1.2937*** 0.7961*** 0.8755** 0.4311** 0.4296**
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.3213)  (0.3844)  (0.1183)  (0.3297)  (0.1974)  (0.2514)  (0.1507)  (0.4904)  (0.1371)  (0.2000)
Log Likelihood -3416.15 -1354.6 -3143.06 -1237.22 -2617.48 -894.705 -2558.18 -1026.96 -2635.13 -993.766
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1104 554 1040 508 808 350 893 456 883 436
The table reports Negative Binomial Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates, associating civil conflict incidents with ethnic partitioning at the country-ethnic homeland level. The 
dependent variable is the total number of civil conflict incidents in an ethnic homeland within a country over the period 1997-2010. In columns (1)-(2) we exclude ethnicity-
country observations that fall in North Africa. In columns (3)-(4) we exclude observations that fall in South Africa. In columns (5)-(6) exclude observations that fall in West 
Africa. In columns (7)-(8) we exclude observations that fall in East Africa. In column (9)-(10) we exclude observations that fall in Central Africa The regional classification 
follows Nunn (2007). All specifications include country fixed effects (constants not reported). The set of simple controls includes the log of land area, the log of (1 + land area 
under water) (lakes, rivers, and other streams), and the log of population in 1960. The set of location controls includes the distance of the centroid of each country-ethnic homeland 
from the respective capital, from the sea coast, from the national border, and an indicator that takes on the value of one if a capital city falls in the homeland of an ethnic group 
within a country. The set of geographic controls includes an index of land suitability for agriculture, mean elevation, a malaria stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil 
field indicator. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. The table reports in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the country and the 
ethno-linguistic family dimensions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 9B: Ethnic Partitioning and Civil Conflict
Sensitivity Analysis: Excluding Each Time a Different African Region
Excluding
North South West East Central
Weighting Matrix
Spatial Model Type Simple Durbin Generalized Simple Durbin Generalized
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SPLIT Indicator (Partitioning) 0.1891** 0.1754** 0.1822** 0.1844** 0.1582** 0.1685** 
 (0.0765)  (0.0757)  (0.0765)  (0.0756)  (0.0777)  (0.0781)
Log Likelihood -1750.65 -1670.10 -1744.80 -1740.92 -1671.16 -1736.70
Observations 1182 1182 1182 1182 1182 1182
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The table reports spatial auto-regressive model maximum-likelihood estimates, associating civil conflict incidents with ethnic partitioning at 
the country-ethnicity level. The dependent variable is the log of one plus the total number of civil conflict incidents in an ethnic region within a 
country over the period 1997-2010. Columns (1) and (4) report simple spatial lag models that control for conflict in neighbouring regions. 
Columns (2) and (5) report Durbin spatial models that include as additional controls the vector of independent variables in neighbouring 
regions. Columns (3) and (6) report generalized spatial lag models that control both for conflicts in neighbouring regions and for the effect of 
the independent variables in nearby regions. In columns (1)-(3) we use a linear in Eucledian distance to the centroid of each country-ethnic 
region weighting matrix. In columns (4)-(6) we use a quadratic in Eucledian distance to the centroid of each country-ethnic region weighting 
matrix. The set of simple controls includes the log of land area, the log of (1 + land area under water) (lakes, rivers, and other streams), and the 
log of population in 1960. The set of location controls includes the distance of the centroid of each country-ethnic homeland from the 
respective capital, from the sea coast, from the national border, and an indicator that takes on the value of one if a capital city falls in the 
homeland of an ethnic group within a country. The set of geographic controls includes an index of land suitability for agriculture, mean 
elevation, a malaria stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions 
and data sources. The table reports in parentheses standard errors accounting for heteroskedasticity and spatial correlation. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 10: Ethnic Partitioning and Civil Conflict
Sensitivity Analysis: Accounting for Spillovers with Spatial Models
Linear in Eucledian Distance Quadratic in Eucledian Distance
Excl. 
Outliers Excl. Capitals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SPLIT Indicator (Partitioning) 0.4234*** 0.4439** 0.6224*** 0.5565*** 0.5995*** 0.5531***
(0.1657) (0.1852) (0.1859) (0.1732) (0.1664) (0.1760)
Log Likelihood -3382.90 -3183.73 -3107.80 -3095.23 -2991.64 -2854.01
Observations 1182 1182 1182 1182 1170 1139
SPLIT Indicator (Partitioning) 0.9258*** 0.5588*** 0.7778*** 0.7943*** 0.7830*** 0.8183***
(0.2995) (0.2149) (0.2779) (0.2636) (0.2757) (0.2864)
Log Likelihood -1330.075 -1164.565 -1125.269 -1120.363 -1028.719 -995.075
Observations 1038 1038 1038 1038 1026 1005
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Data only from NGOs and United Nation's Reports
The table reports Negative Binomial Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates associating civil conflict with ethnic partitioning at the country-
ethnic homeland level. The dependent variable in all columns is the total number of conflict incidents at the country-ethnic homeland 
level. In Panel A we use conflict events reported by international media, news agencies, NGOs, and the United Nations. In Panel B we use 
conflict events reported by NGOs and the United Nations. In columns (1)-(4) we estimate the specifications in the full sample. The 
specification in column (5) excludes country-ethnic homelands where the dependent variable exceeds the 99th percentile. The 
specification in column (6) excludes country-ethnic homelands where capital cities fall. The set of simple controls includes the log of land 
area, the log of (1 + land area under water) (lakes, rivers, and other streams), and the log of population in 1960. The set of location 
controls includes the distance of the centroid of each country-ethnic homeland from the respective capital, from the sea coast, from the 
national border, and an indicator that takes on the value of one if a capital city falls in the homeland of an ethnic group within a country. 
The set of geographic controls includes an index of land suitability for agriculture, mean elevation, a malaria stability index, a diamond 
mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. All specifications 
include country fixed effects (constants not reported). The table reports in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the country and 
the ethno-linguistic family dimensions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 11: Ethnic Partitioning and Civil Conflict
Sensitivity Analysis: Distinguishing between Conflict Incident Media Sources
All Observations
Panel A: Data from All International Sources
ALL Battles Violence ALL Battles Violence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SPLIT Indicator (Partitioning) 0.6309*** 0.6184*** 0.4958*** 0.8234*** 0.7975** 0.8486***
(0.1857) (0.1753) (0.1632) (0.3079) (0.3649) (0.2530)
Log Likelihood -3600.55 -2628.39 -2500.89 -1426.05 -999.88 -979.25
SPLIT Indicator (Partitioning) 0.5198*** 0.5257*** 0.4316*** 0.7633*** 0.7910** 0.8117***
(0.1813) (0.1652) (0.1585) (0.2907) (0.3486) (0.2299)
Log Likelihood -3599.87 -2629.526 -2501.75 -1428.978 -1003.138 -981.882
SPLIT Indicator (Partitioning) 0.5198*** 0.5257*** 0.4316*** 0.7633*** 0.7910*** 0.8117***
(0.1927) (0.1779) (0.1654) (0.2980) (0.3350) (0.2402)
Log Likelihood -3600.55 -2629.22 -2501.68 -1428.85 -1003.76 -980.99
Observations 1182 1182 1182 590 590 590
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 12: Ethnic Partitioning and Civil Conflict
Sensitivity Analysis: Controlling for Pre-colonial Conflict (1400-1700)
Panel A: Controlling fo Pre-colonial Conflict (1400-1700)
Panel C: Controlling for Slave Trades
The table reports Negative Binomial Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates associating various aspects of civil conflict with ethnic 
partitioning at the country-ethnic homeland level. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (4) is the total number of conflict incidents; 
the dependent variable in columns (2) and (5) is the total number of battles between government forces, rebel groups, and militias; the 
dependent variable in columns (3) and (6) is the number of violent events against civilian populations.  In Panel A we estimate the 
specifications in the full sample. In columns (4)-(6) we restrict estimation on ethnicity-country areas close to the national border (using as a 
cutoff the median distance from the centroid of each ethnic homeland within a country to the national border; 62 kilometers). In Panel A we 
we control for the distance of each ethnic homeland to the centroid of the closest war during the period 1400-1700, usinig data from Besley 
and Reynal-Quaerol (2012).  In Panel B we control an indicator variable that takes the value of one when the historical homeland falls 
within the boundaries of a large pre-colonial kingdom and empire using data from Besley and Reynal-Quaerol (2012). In Panel C we 
control for the log of one plus the number of slaves at the ethnicity level normalized by the surface area of each homeland, using data from 
Nunn (2008) and Nunn and Watchekon (2011).
The set of simple controls includes the log of land area, the log of (1 + land area under water) (lakes, rivers, and other streams), and the log 
of population in 1960. The set of location controls includes the distance of the centroid of each country-ethnic homeland from the 
respective capital, from the sea coast, from the national border, and an indicator that takes on the value of one if a capital city falls in the 
homeland of an ethnic group within a country. The set of geographic controls includes an index of land suitability for agriculture, mean 
elevation, a malaria stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable 
definitions and data sources. All specifications include country fixed effects (constants not reported). The table reports in parentheses 
double-clustered standard errors at the country and the ethno-linguistic family dimensions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
All 
Ethnicity-Country Homelands
Ethnicity-Country Homelands Close 
to the National Border
Panel B: Controlling for Pre-colonial Kingdoms/Empires
All Obs
No 
Outliers
No 
Capitals All Obs
No 
Outliers
No 
Capitals All Obs
No 
Outliers
No 
Capitals All Obs
No 
Outliers
No 
Capitals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
FRAC 0.7463** 0.6824* 0.7422** 0.8122* 0.687 0.8115**
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.3707)  (0.3883)  (0.3724)  (0.4340)  (0.4237)  (0.4337)
SPLIT-ALT 0.4974*** 0.5119*** 0.5178*** 0.8614*** 0.8412*** 0.8612***
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.1621)  (0.1728)  (0.1637)  (0.2377)  (0.2377)  (0.2374)
Log Likelihood -3612.47 -3349.05 -3507.77 -3608.11 -3344.23 -3502.91 -1392.54 -1329.67 -1384.94 -1387.22 -1324.50 -1379.63
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population Density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1182 1139 1170 1182 1139 1170 576 565 575 576 565 575
Table 13: Ethnic Partitioning and Civil Conflict
Sensitity Analysis: Alternative Measures of Ethnic Partitioning 
All Ethnicity-Country Homelands All Ethnicity-Country Homelands Close to the Border
The table reports Negative Binomial Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates, associating civil conflict incidents with ethnic partitioning at the country-ethnic homeland level. The 
dependent variable is the total number of civil conflict incidents at each ethnic homeland in each country over the period 1997-2010. FRAC is a continuous measure of ethnic 
partitioning that reflects the probability that a randomly chosen pixel (area) of the historical homeland of an ethnic group falls into a different country. SPLIT-ALT is an indicator 
variable that identifies partitioned ethnicities as those with at least 5% of the historical homeland falling into more than one contemporary country. All specifications include 
country fixed effects (constants not reported). The specifications in columns (7)-(12) focus on country-ethnic areas close to the national border (using as a cutoff the median 
distance from the centroid of each ethnicity-country to the national border; 62 kilometers). The specifications in columns (2), (5), (8) and (11) exclude country-ethnic homelands 
where the dependent variable exceeds the 99th percentile. The specifications in columns (3), (6), (9), and (12) exclude country-ethnic homelands where capital cities fall. The set 
of simple controls includes the log of land area, the log of (1 + land area under water) (lakes, rivers, and other streams), and the log of population in 1960. The set of location 
controls includes the distance of the centroid of each country-ethnic homeland from the respective capital, from the sea coast, from the national border, and an indicator that takes 
on the value of one if a capital city falls in the homeland of an ethnic group within a country. The set of geographic controls includes an index of land suitability for agriculture, 
mean elevation, a malaria stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. The table 
reports in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the country and the ethno-linguistic family dimensions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively.
Excl. 
Outliers
Excl. 
Capitals
Excl. 
Outliers
Excl. 
Capitals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
SPLIT (Partitioning) 0.7170*** 0.4918** 0.4421*** 0.3603*** 0.3383*** 0.3516*** 0.5262*** 0.3525*** 0.3619*** 0.3191*** 0.2672*** 0.3157***
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.1288)  (0.0968)  (0.0836)  (0.0899)  (0.0923)  (0.0905)  (0.1490)  (0.1230)  (0.0967)  (0.0948)  (0.1029)  (0.0961)
Log Likelihood -4850.15 -4489.32 -4414.53 -4365.37 -4149.16 -4022.85 -2338.24 -2081.06 -2061.75 -2040.4 -1970.1 -1904.15
SPLIT (Partitioning) 0.2467*** 0.1496** 0.0747** 0.0903** 0.0803** 0.0856** 0.1729*** 0.0843** 0.0794* 0.1097*** 0.0933** 0.1148***
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.0586)  (0.0664)  (0.0377)  (0.0374)  (0.0334)  (0.0364)  (0.0172)  (0.0390)  (0.0440)  (0.0388)  (0.0397)  (0.0385)
Adjusted R-squared 0.381 0.546 0.597 0.609 0.569 0.54 0.283 0.537 0.587 0.602 0.579 0.542
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2405 2405 2405 2405 2379 2353 1202 1202 1202 1202 1194 1182
The table reports Negative Binomial Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates in Panel A and OLS estimates (in Panel B), associating civil conflict incidents with ethnic partitioning 
at the country-ethnic homeland level. The dependent variable in Panel A is the total number of civil conflict incidents in an ethnic homeland within a country over the period 1997-
2010. The dependent variable in Panel B is the log of one plus the total number of civil conflict incidents at each ethnic homeland in each country over the period 1997-2010. 
SPLIT is an indicator variable that identifies partitioned groups as those that Ethnologue maps into more than one contemporary country. The specifications in columns (2)-(6) and 
(7)-(12) include country fixed effects (constants not reported). The set of simple controls includes the log of land area, the log of (1 + land area under water) (lakes, rivers, and 
other streams), and the log of population in 2000. The set of location controls includes the distance of the centroid of each country-ethnic homeland from the respective capital, 
from the sea coast, from the national border, and an indicator that takes on the value of one if a capital city falls in the homeland of an ethnic group within a country. The set of 
geographic controls includes an index of land suitability for agriculture, mean elevation, a malaria stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. The Data 
Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. The table reports in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the country and the ethno-linguistic family 
dimensions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
Panel A: NB ML Estimates 
Panel B: LS Estimates
Table 14: Ethnic Partitioning and Civil Conflict
Results with Ethnologue's Mapping of Linguistic Groups
All Language-Country Homelands Language-Country Homelands Close to the National Border
All Observations All Observations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SPLIT (Partitioning) 0.4614 0.4283 0.6553** 0.4526 0.7451*** 0.6319** 0.4583** 0.3627
(0.2915) (0.3073) (0.2690) (0.3023) (0.2190) (0.2756) (0.2347) (0.2499)
SPLIT (Partitioning) Interaced with an Indicator of:
  High Ethnic Fractionaliza 0.3137                 
 (0.8944)                 
  High Linguistic Fractionalization 0.3772                 
 (1.0332)                 
  High Religious Fractionalization -0.076                 
 (0.1242)                 
  High Cultural Heterogeneity 0.3262                 
 (0.9244)                 
  High Ethnic Polarization -0.2928                 
(0.3209)                 
  High Ethnic Seggregation -0.0192                 
 (0.2390)                 
  High Land Area (Size) 0.3897                 
 (1.0509)                 
  Landlocked Indicator 0.6598*
(0.3798)
Log Likelihood -3602.165 -3601.703 -3603.129 -3602.073 -3602.318 -3603.188 -3601.676 -3599
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location & Geo  Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1182 1182 1182 1182 1182 1182 1182 1182
The table reports Negative Binomial Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates associating civil conflict with ethnic partitioning at the country-
ethnic homeland level. The dependent variable is the total number of civil conflict incidents at each ethnic homeland within a country over 
the period 1997-2010. SPLIT is an indicator variable that identifies partitioned ethnicities as those with at least 10% of the historical 
homeland falling into more than one contemporary country. All specifications include interactions terms of the SPLIT index with dummy 
variables identifying countries with high ethnic fractionalization (in (1)), linguistic fractionalization (in (2)), religious fractionalization (in 
(3)), cultural heterogeneity (in (4)), ethno-linguistic polarization (in (5), ethnic segregation (in (6)), large in terms of size, (in (7)), and 
landlocked countries (in (8)). With all measures we use the median value of the respective variable. All specifications include country fixed 
effects (constants not reported). 
The set of simple controls includes the log of land area, the log of (1 + land area under water) (lakes, rivers, and other streams), and the log 
of population in 1960. The set of location controls includes the distance of the centroid of each country-ethnic homeland from the respective 
capital, from the sea coast, from the national border, and an indicator that takes on the value of one if a capital city falls in the homeland of 
an ethnic group within a country. The set of geographic controls includes an index of land suitability for agriculture, mean elevation, a 
malaria stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data 
sources. The table reports in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the country and the ethno-linguistic family dimensions. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 15: Ethnic Partitioning and Civil Conflict. Heterogeneous Effects
Panel A: Fragmentation, Size, and Landlocked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SPLIT (Partitioning) 0.8289*** 0.9139*** 0.9720*** 0.9153*** 1.1205*** 1.2715*** 0.8648*** 1.4545***
(0.2182) (0.2503) (0.2782) (0.2295) (0.2954) (0.3326) (0.2596) (0.3684)
SPLIT (Partitioning) Interaced with an Indicator of:
  High Rule of Law -0.4397                
(0.3677)                
               
  Democracy Indicator -0.8405*** -0.6958**                
(0.3963)  (0.2727)                
               
  High Democratic Capital -0.7152*** -0.7032***                
(0.2956)  (0.2106)                
               
  High Income -0.7244*** -0.6016** -0.7195***                
(0.3449) (0.3358) (0.2885)                
              
  Executive Constraints at independence -0.6346***-0.6467***
(0.2916) (0.2679)
  High Income at Independence -1.0945***
(0.3795)
Log Likelihood -3601.185 -3596.972 -3597.876 -3597.585 -3593.267 -3592.267 -3599.011 -2914.94
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location & Geo Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1182 1182 1182 1182 1182 1182 1182 1023
The table reports Negative Binomial Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates associating civil conflict with ethnic partitioning at the country-
ethnic homeland level. The dependent variable is the total number of civil conflict incidents at each ethnic homeland within a country over 
the period 1997-2010. SPLIT is an indicator variable that identifies partitioned ethnicities as those with at least 10% of the historical 
homeland falling into more than one contemporary country. All specifications include interactions terms of the SPLIT index with dummy 
variables identifying countries scoring high in a composite rule of law index (in (1)), classified as democracies (in (2) and (5)), scoring high 
in a democratic capital variable (in (3) and (6)), with high income (in (4)-(6)), with high executive constraints at independence (in (7)-(8)), 
and with high income in 1961 (in (8)). With all measures we use the median value of the respective variable.  All specifications include 
country fixed effects (constants not reported). 
The set of simple controls includes the log of land area, the log of (1 + land area under water) (lakes, rivers, and other streams), and the log 
of population in 1960. The set of location controls includes the distance of the centroid of each country-ethnic homeland from the respective 
capital, from the sea coast, from the national border, and an indicator that takes on the value of one if a capital city falls in the homeland of 
an ethnic group within a country. The set of geographic controls includes an index of land suitability for agriculture, mean elevation, a 
malaria stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data 
sources. The table reports in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the country and the ethno-linguistic family dimensions. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 15: Ethnic Partitioning and Civil Conflict. Heterogeneous Effects
Panel B: Institutional and Economic Development
All types of conflict 1
Battles 0.8733* 1
Violent events against civilians 0.9049* 0.6068* 1
Battles resulting is change of territory (Indicator) 0.2529* 0.3164* 0.1422* 1
All types of conflict 1
Battles 0.8268* 1
Violent events against civilians 0.8839* 0.4965* 1
Battles resulting is change of territory (Indicator) 0.2462* 0.3208* 0.1209* 1
Appendix Table 1: Correlation Structure of the Main Dependent Variables
The table reports the correlation structure between all ACLED civil conflict measures. Panel A reports the correlogram at the ethnic 
homeland level (N=826 ); Panel B reports the correlogram at the country-ethnicity level (N=1182 ). * indicates statistical significance at 
the 95% confidence level. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources.
Panel A: Ethnic Homeland Level
Panel B: Country-Ethnicity Homeland Level
Obs. mean st. dev. min p25 median p75 p99 max
All Civil Conflict Incidents 826 52.39 195.69 0.00 1.00 4.00 34.00 580.00 2916.00
Battles 826 22.65 94.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 13.00 313.00 1608.00
Battles with Territorial Change 826 19.18 96.20 0.00 0.00 1.00 9.00 231.00 2009.00
Violent Events against Civilians 826 0.27 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Population at Independence 826 328,991 1,063,156 57 41,810 118,160 303,659 2,912,382 25,700,000
Land Area 826 34.17 59.18 0.24 6.16 14.48 36.07 286.33 604.90
Land Area under Water 826 0.86 2.26 0.00 0.01 0.17 0.68 10.87 27.66
Catital City Indicator 826 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Distance to the Capital City 826 141.15 126.00 0.00 44.87 102.25 204.98 536.73 636.87
Distance to the Sea Coast 826 499.98 371.34 11.31 255.59 391.81 629.83 1673.47 1846.93
Distance to the National Border 826 597.49 432.10 0.22 208.79 554.35 918.12 1609.77 1721.30
Mean Elevation 826 0.62 0.44 0.00 0.30 0.49 0.94 1.84 2.17
Land Suitability for Agriculture 826 0.41 0.24 0.00 0.26 0.42 0.57 0.93 0.98
Malaria Stability Index 826 0.75 0.36 0.00 0.58 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00
Oil Indicator 826 0.13 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 4.00
Diamond Mine Indicator 826 0.12 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
All Civil Conflict Incidents 1182 33.63 139.63 0.00 0.00 2.00 18.00 438.00 2888.00
Battles 1182 14.54 67.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.00 238.00 1608.00
Battles with Territorial Change 1182 1.94 7.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 100.00
Violent Events against Civilians 1182 12.25 72.43 0.00 0.00 1.00 5.00 182.00 2009.00
Population at Independence 1182 222,093 880,884  17   15,528  62,931   186,570  2,143,565   25,600,000  
Land Area 1182 22.41 40.68 0.11 2.81 8.33 23.29 216.23 493.82
Land Area under Water 1182 0.51 1.39 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.40 6.18 21.63
Catital City Indicator 1182 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Distance to the Capital City 1182 0.51 0.36 0.01 0.26 0.41 0.63 1.70 1.88
Distance to the Sea Coast 1182 0.60 0.43 0.00 0.23 0.56 0.93 1.63 1.74
Distance to the National Border 1182 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.16 0.52 0.64
Mean Elevation 1182 0.62 0.44 0.00 0.29 0.49 0.95 1.91 2.18
Land Suitability for Agriculture 1182 0.41 0.24 0.00 0.25 0.42 0.57 0.94 0.98
Malaria Stability Index 1182 0.72 0.34 0.00 0.50 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00
Oil Indicator 1182 0.09 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Diamond Mine Indicator 1182 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Appendix Table 2: Summary Statistics 
The table reports descriptive statistics for all variables employed in the empirical analysis. Panel A reports summary statistics for all control 
variables at the ethnic homelad level. Panel B reports summary statistics for all control variables at the country-ethnicity sample.  The Data 
Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources.
Panel A: Ethnic Homeland Level
Panel B: Country-Ethnic Homeland Level
ALL Battles Violence ALL Battles Violence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SPLIT Indicator (Partitioning) 0.5198*** 0.5257*** 0.4316*** 0.7633*** 0.7910** 0.8117***
(0.1731) (0.1657) (0.1600) (0.2984) (0.3471) (0.2403)
Log Likelihood -3601.378 -2628.953 -2500.478 -1433.027 -1004.356 -983.873
Observations 1182 1182 1182 590 590 590
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The table reports Negative Binomial Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates associating various aspects of civil conflict with ethnic 
partitioning at the country-ethnic homeland level. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (4) is the total number of conflict incidents; 
the dependent variable in columns (2) and (5) is the total number of battles between government forces, rebel groups, and militias; the 
dependent variable in columns (3) and (6) is the number of violent events against civilian populations.  In columns (1)-(3) we estimate the 
specifications in the full sample. In columns (4)-(6) we restrict estimation on ethnicity-country areas close to the national border (using as 
a cutoff the median distance from the centroid of each ethnic homeland within a country to the national border; 62 kilometers).  The set of 
simple controls includes the log of land area, the log of (1 + land area under water) (lakes, rivers, and other streams), and the log of 
population in 2000. The set of location controls includes the distance of the centroid of each country-ethnic homeland from the respective 
capital, from the sea coast, from the national border, and an indicator that takes on the value of one if a capital city falls in the homeland of 
an ethnic group within a country. The set of geographic controls includes an index of land suitability for agriculture, mean elevation, a 
malaria stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and 
data sources. All specifications include country fixed effects (constants not reported). The table reports in parentheses double-clustered 
standard errors at the country and the ethno-linguistic family dimensions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively.
Appendix Table 3: Ethnic Partitioning and Civil Conflict
Sensitivity Analysis: Controlling for Population in 2000
All Ethnic Homelands
 Ethnic Homelands close to the 
National Border
Excl. 
Outliers Excl. Capitals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SPLIT Indicator (Partitioning) 0.4176** 0.4572*** 0.5672*** 0.5463*** 0.5802*** 0.5762***
(0.1923) (0.1736) (0.1721) (0.1606) (0.1533) (0.1675)
Log Likelihood -2555.53 -2352.632 -2292.014 -2281.25 -2193.339 -2094.972
Observations 1182 1182 1182 1182 1170 1139
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
The table reports Negative Binomial Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates associating civil conflict with ethnic partitioning at the country-
ethnic homeland level. The dependent variable in all columns is the total number of deadly conflict incidents at the country-ethnic 
homeland level. To identify deadly incidents we go over the event description searching for keywords "kill, death, died". In columns (1)-
(4) we estimate the specifications in the full sample. The specification in column (5) excludes country-ethnic homelands where the 
dependent variable exceeds the 99th percentile. The specification in column (6) excludes country-ethnic homelands where capital cities 
fall. The set of simple controls includes the log of land area, the log of (1 + land area under water) (lakes, rivers, and other streams), and 
the log of population in 1960. The set of location controls includes the distance of the centroid of each country-ethnic homeland from the 
respective capital, from the sea coast, from the national border, and an indicator that takes on the value of one if a capital city falls in the 
homeland of an ethnic group within a country. The set of geographic controls includes an index of land suitability for agriculture, mean 
elevation, a malaria stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable 
definitions and data sources. All specifications include country fixed effects (constants not reported). The table reports in parentheses 
double-clustered standard errors at the country and the ethno-linguistic family dimensions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Appendix Table 4: Ethnic Partitioning and Deadly Civil Conflict
All Observations
Excl. 
Outliers
Excl. 
Capitals
Excl. 
Outliers
Excl. 
Capitals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
SPLIT (Partitioning) 0.8545*** 0.8543*** 0.8536*** 0.6579*** 0.7706*** 0.7288*** 0.6687** 0.6884*** 0.7843** 0.5764 0.6919* 0.6408
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.2970)  (0.2516)  (0.2305)  (0.2240)  (0.1991)  (0.2363)  (0.2788)  (0.1984)  (0.3383)  (0.3880)  (0.3456)  (0.4308)
Log Likelihood -2483.17 -2452.05 -2418.24 -2406.04 -2349.76 -2171.71 -1213.03 -1193.44 -1176.18 -1165.08 -1113.3 -1060.28
SPLIT (Partitioning) 0.6025*** 0.5750*** 0.5300** 0.5327** 0.6435*** 0.6119** 0.6184** 0.6389*** 0.9951*** 0.9688*** 1.1552*** 0.9986***
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.2580)  (0.2489)  (0.2592)  (0.2507)  (0.2659)  (0.2549)  (0.2182)  (0.1913)  (0.2818)  (0.3062)  (0.2950)  (0.3186)
Log Likelihood -2342.88 -2316.08 -2296.55 -2294.53 -2241.91 -2049.53 -1159.94 -1144.5 -1137.28 -1133.69 -1081.03 -1030.17
SPLIT (Partitioning) 0.1037** 0.1165*** 0.1181*** 0.1191*** __ 0.1364*** 0.1156** 0.1272*** 0.0905** __ 0.0989** 
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.0490)  (0.0331)  (0.0414)  (0.0374)  (0.0395)  (0.0468)  (0.0390)  (0.0474)  (0.0365)  (0.0398)
Adjusted R-squared 0.091 0.225 0.257 0.278 0.281 0.1 0.199 0.235 0.283 0.282
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 826 826 826 826 821 779 413 413 413 413 408 393
Panel A: Battles
Panel B: Violence against Civilians
Panel C: Battles that Resulted in a Change of Territory 
Appendix Table 5: Ethnic Partitioning and Alternative Measures of Civil Conflict
Cross-Sectional Estimates
All Ethnic Homelands Ethnic Homelands Close to the National Border
All Observations All Observations
The table reports Negative Binomial Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates, associating civil conflict incidents with ethnic partitioning at the ethnic homeland level. The 
dependent variable in Panel A, B, C is the total number of battles, violence against civialians, battles resulting in territorial change at each ethnic homeland over the period 1997-
2010, respectively. SPLIT is an indicator variable that identifies partitioned ethnicities as those with at least 10% of the historical homeland falling into more than one 
contemporary country. The specifications in columns (2)-(6) and (7)-(12) include region fixed effects (constants not reported). The specifications in columns (7)-(12) focus on 
country-ethnicity areas close to the national border (using as a cutoff the median distance from the centroid of each ethnicity-country homeland to the national border; 102 
kilometers). The specifications in columns (5) and (11) exclude ethnic homelands where the dependent variable exceeds the 99th percentile. The specifications in columns (6) and 
(12) exclude ethnic homelands where capital cities fall. The set of simple controls includes the log of land area, the log of (1 + land area under water) (lakes, rivers, and other 
streams), and the log of population in 1960. The set of location controls includes the distance of the centroid of each ethnic homeland from the capital, from the sea coast, from 
the national border, and an indicator that takes on the value of one if a capital city falls in the homeland of an ethnic group within a country. The set of geographic controls 
includes an index of land suitability for agriculture, mean elevation, a malaria stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. The Data Appendix gives 
detailed variable definitions and data sources. The table reports in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the country and the ethno-linguistic family dimensions. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Excl. 
Outliers Excl. Capitals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SPLIT Indicator (Partitioning) -0.1531 -0.0726 0.1372 0.1253 0.1367 0.1069
(0.2897) (0.2051) (0.2176) (0.2156) (0.2120) (0.2298)
Log Likelihood -1878.551 -1727.347 -1669.145 -1659.251 -1567.01 -1443.98
Observations 1182 1182 1182 1182 1170 1139
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Appendix Table 6: Ethnic Partitioning and Riots and Protests
All Observations
The table reports Negative Binomial Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates associating riots and protests with ethnic partitioning at the 
country-ethnic homeland level. The dependent variable in all columns is the total number of riots and protests at the country-ethnic 
homeland level. In columns (1)-(4) we estimate the specifications in the full sample. The specification in column (5) excludes country-
ethnic homelands where the dependent variable exceeds the 99th percentile. The specification in column (6) excludes country-ethnic 
homelands where capital cities fall. The set of simple controls includes the log of land area, the log of (1 + land area under water) (lakes, 
rivers, and other streams), and the log of population in 1960. The set of location controls includes the distance of the centroid of each 
country-ethnic homeland from the respective capital, from the sea coast, from the national border, and an indicator that takes on the value 
of one if a capital city falls in the homeland of an ethnic group within a country. The set of geographic controls includes an index of land 
suitability for agriculture, mean elevation, a malaria stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. The Data 
Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. All specifications include country fixed effects (constants not reported). 
The table reports in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the country and the ethno-linguistic family dimensions. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
All Obs
No 
Capitals No Outliers All Obs
No 
Capitals No Outliers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SPLIT Indicator (Partitioning) 0.3337*** 0.3518*** 0.3625*** 0.4841*** 0.4617*** 0.4947***
 (0.1182)  (0.1119)  (0.1174)  (0.1186)  (0.1212)  (0.1255)
Log Number of Conflicts Ethnic Family 0.0755** 0.0718** 0.0828** 0.0837** 0.0759** 0.0828** 
 (0.0337)  (0.0332)  (0.0330)  (0.0361)  (0.0366)  (0.0386)
Log Number of Conflicts Counrry 0.1716*** 0.1715*** 0.1721*** 0.1740*** 0.1614*** 0.1629***
 (0.0368)  (0.0373)  (0.0379)  (0.0436)  (0.0445)  (0.0425)
adjsuted R-squared 0.430 0.406 0.378 0.393 0.378 0.348
SPLIT Indicator (Partitioning) 0.1867** 0.1931** 0.1834** 0.3124*** 0.3151*** 0.3329***
 (0.0928)  (0.0894)  (0.0885)  (0.1197)  (0.1179)  (0.1223)
Log Number of Conflicts at the Ethnic Family 0.0239 0.0222 0.0311 0.0117 0.0056 0.0126
 (0.0218)  (0.0221)  (0.0230)  (0.0326)  (0.0333)  (0.0355)
Log Number of Conflicts at the Counrry -0.0650** -0.0599* -0.0603** 0.0074 0.0051 0.0115
 (0.0309)  (0.0309)  (0.0307)  (0.0426)  (0.0455)  (0.0439)
adjsuted R-squared 0.620 0.596 0.579 0.603 0.595 0.575
Observations 1182 1170 1139 590 575 565
Simple & Location & Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Within Country Specifications
The table reports OLS estimates, associating civil conflict incidents with ethnic partitioning at the country-ethnicity level, accounting for 
spatial spillovers. Panel A reports cross-sectional estimates. Panel B reports within country estimates (that include country constants). The 
dependent variable is the log of one plus the total number of civil conflict incidents in an ethnic region within a country over the period 1997-
2010. The specifications in columns (4)-(6) focus on country-ethnicity areas close to the national border (using as a cutoff the median distance 
from the centroid of each ethnicity-country to the national border; 62 kilometers). The specifications in columns (2) and (5) exclude country-
ethnic homelands where the dependent variable exceeds the 99th percentile. The specifications in columns (3) and (6) exclude country-ethnic 
homelands where capital cities fall. In all specifications we control for the log of one plus the total number of all conflict incidents in each 
ethnic family and the log of one plus the total number of all conflict incidents in each country minus conflicts in each country-ethnic area. The 
set of simple controls includes the log of land area, the log of (1 + land area under water) (lakes, rivers, and other streams), and the log of 
population in 1960. The set of location controls includes the distance of the centroid of each country-ethnic homeland from the respective 
capital, from the sea coast, from the national border, and an indicator that takes on the value of one if a capital city falls in the homeland of an 
ethnic group within a country. The set of geographic controls includes an index of land suitability for agriculture, mean elevation, a malaria 
stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. 
The table reports in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the country and the ethno-linguistic family dimensions. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Appendix Table 7: Ethnic Partitioning and Civil Conflict
Sensitivity Analysis: Accounting for Spillovers at the Country Level and at the Ethnic Family Level
All Ethnic Homelands
 Ethnic Homelands close to the 
National Border
Panel A: Cross-Sectional Specifications
ALL Battles Violence ALL Battles Violence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SPLIT Indicator (Partitioning) 0.6001*** 0.5955*** 0.4835*** 0.8339*** 0.8257*** 0.8584***
(0.1888) (0.1712) (0.1725) (0.3044) (0.3610) (0.2490)
Log Likelihood -3358.92 -2456.361 -2320.049 -1384.865 -986.274 -954.654
Observations 1120 1120 1120 566 566 566
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The table reports Negative Binomial Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates associating various aspects of civil conflict with ethnic partitioning 
at the country-ethnic homeland level dropping from the estimation ethnic homelands that experienced a major war over the period 1400-1700. 
The dependent variable in columns (1) and (4) is the total number of conflict incidents; the dependent variable in columns (2) and (5) is the 
total number of battles between government forces, rebel groups, and militias; the dependent variable in columns (3) and (6) is the number of 
violent events against civilian populations.  In columns (1)-(3) we estimate the specifications in the full sample. In columns (4)-(6) we restrict 
estimation on ethnicity-country areas close to the national border (using as a cutoff the median distance from the centroid of each ethnic 
homeland within a country to the national border; 62 kilometers).  The set of simple controls includes the log of land area, the log of (1 + land 
area under water) (lakes, rivers, and other streams), and the log of population in 1960. The set of location controls includes the distance of the 
centroid of each country-ethnic homeland from the respective capital, from the sea coast, from the national border, and an indicator that takes 
on the value of one if a capital city falls in the homeland of an ethnic group within a country. The set of geographic controls includes an index 
of land suitability for agriculture, mean elevation, a malaria stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. The Data 
Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. All specifications include country fixed effects (constants not reported). The 
table reports in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the country and the ethno-linguistic family dimensions. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Appendix Table 8: Ethnic Partitioning and Civil Conflict
Sensitivity Analysis: Excluding Ethnic Homelands that Experienced Pre-colonial Conflict (1400-1700)
All Ethnic Homelands
 Ethnic Homelands close to the 
National Border
ALL Battles Violence ALL Battles Violence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SPLIT Indicator (Partitioning) 0.6878*** 0.6657*** 0.4405** 1.0696*** 1.0591*** 0.9429***
(0.2216) (0.1907) (0.2231) (0.3664) (0.4144) (0.2280)
Log Likelihood -2118.812 -1587.995 -1442.143 -740.609 -541.919 -492.551
Observations 707 707 707 324 324 324
SPLIT Indicator (Partitioning) 0.5431*** 0.5171*** 0.5206*** 0.7070*** 0.7196** 0.9147***
(0.2149) (0.2234) (0.2298) (0.2855) (0.3155) (0.3156)
Log Likelihood -1826.794 -1355.116 -1287.782 -769.822 -548.136 -536.68
Observations 583 583 583 305 305 305
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The table reports Negative Binomial Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates associating various aspects of civil conflict with ethnic partitioning 
at the country-ethnic homeland level dropping from the estimation ethnic homelands that were part of large pre-colonial states, kingdoms, and 
empires using the classification of O'Brian (1999) in Panel A and using the classification of Murdock (1967) in Panel B. The dependent 
variable in columns (1) and (4) is the total number of conflict incidents; the dependent variable in columns (2) and (5) is the total number of 
battles between government forces, rebel groups, and militias; the dependent variable in columns (3) and (6) is the number of violent events 
against civilian populations.  In columns (1)-(3) we estimate the specifications in the full sample. In columns (4)-(6) we restrict estimation on 
ethnicity-country areas close to the national border (using as a cutoff the median distance from the centroid of each ethnic homeland within a 
country to the national border; 62 kilometers).  The set of simple controls includes the log of land area, the log of (1 + land area under water) 
(lakes, rivers, and other streams), and the log of population in 1960. The set of location controls includes the distance of the centroid of each 
country-ethnic homeland from the respective capital, from the sea coast, from the national border, and an indicator that takes on the value of 
one if a capital city falls in the homeland of an ethnic group within a country. The set of geographic controls includes an index of land 
suitability for agriculture, mean elevation, a malaria stability index, a diamond mine indicator, and an oil field indicator. The Data Appendix 
gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. All specifications include country fixed effects (constants not reported). The table reports 
in parentheses double-clustered standard errors at the country and the ethno-linguistic family dimensions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: O'Brian (1999) Classification
Panel B: Mudock (1967) Classification
Appendix Table 9: Ethnic Partitioning and Civil Conflict
Sensitivity Analysis: Excluding Ethnic Homelands that Were Part of Large Kingdoms and Empires
All Ethnic Homelands
 Ethnic Homelands close to the 
National Border
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SPLIT - Partitioning 0.2189*** 0.1579*** 0.2434*** 0.1616***
  Double-clustered s.e.  (0.0557)  (0.0526)  (0.0615)  (0.0560)
Log Likelihood -846.11 -809.689 -958.417 -907.662
Simple Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Polynomial Latitude & Longitude Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnic Family Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No
Country Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 826 822 826 822
The table reports Poisson Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates associating various measures of civil war with ethnic 
partitioning. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) is the number of civil wars that have taken place in the historical 
homeland of an ethnic group between 1970 and 2005. The dependent variable in columns (3)-(4) is the number of 
conflict zones associated with civil wars that have affected the historical homeland of an ethnic group during the period 
1970-2005. SPLIT is an indicator variable that identifies partitioned ethnicities as those with at least 10% of the historical 
homeland belonging to more than one contemporary country. The specifications in odd-numbered columns include a set 
of region fixed effects (constants not reported); the specifications in even-numbered columns include a set of country 
fixed effects (constants not reported). The assignment of the country fixed effects is based on the centroid of each ethnic 
homeland. Data on civil wars come from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/International Peace Research 
Institute, Oslo (PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset, Version 4-2006; and Raleigh, Cunningham, Wilhelmsen, and Gleditsch 
(2006).
All specifications include a cubic polynomial in latitude and longitude of the centroid of each ethnic group. All 
specifications include a rich set of conditioning variables, namely log land area, log land area under water (lakes, rivers, 
and other streams), log population around independence, the distance of each ethnic homeland to the national border, the 
distance to the capital city, the distance to the closest sea coast, land suitability for agriculture, mean elevation, a malaria 
stability index, an indicator of early development that equals one when a major city was in the ethnicity’s historical 
homeland in 1400, an oil indicator and a diamond indicator. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and 
data sources. Standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for double clustering at the country-dimension and the 
ethno-linguistic family dimension. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.
Appendix Table 10: Ethnic Partitioning and Civil Wars (1970-2005)
PRIO Dataset
Civil War Incidents Civil War Main Locations
Ethnicity Name
% of Initial 
Homeland Country
# of 
Partitions Ethnicity Name
% of Initial 
Homeland Country
# of 
Partitions
ABABDA 0.72 EGY 2 LAKA (ADAMAWA) 0.69 TCD 3
ABABDA 0.28 SDN 2 LAKA (ADAMAWA) 0.20 CMR 3
ADELE 0.48 GHA 2 LAKA (ADAMAWA) 0.11 CAF 3
ADELE 0.52 TGO 2 LAMBA 0.39 ZAR 2
AFAR 0.17 DJI 3 LAMBA 0.61 ZMB 2
AFAR 0.22 ERI 3 LAMBYA 0.17 MWI 3
AFAR 0.61 ETH 3 LAMBYA 0.33 TZA 3
ALUR 0.16 ZAR 2 LAMBYA 0.50 ZMB 3
ALUR 0.84 UGA 2 LIGBI, DEGHA (SE) 0.72 GHA 2
AMBA 0.87 ZAR 2 LIGBI, DEGHA (SE) 0.28 CIV 2
AMBA 0.13 UGA 2 LOBI 0.42 CIV 2
AMBO 0.41 AGO 2 LOBI 0.58 BFA 2
AMBO 0.59 NAM 2 LUGBARA 0.45 ZAR 3
AMER 0.56 ERI 2 LUGBARA 0.04 SDN 3
AMER 0.44 SDN 2 LUGBARA 0.51 UGA 3
ANA 0.33 BEN 2 LUNGU 0.31 TZA 2
ANA 0.67 TGO 2 LUNGU 0.69 ZMB 2
ANUAK 0.75 ETH 2 LUVALE 0.81 AGO 3
ANUAK 0.25 SDN 2 LUVALE 0.01 ZAR 3
ANYI 0.42 GHA 2 LUVALE 0.17 ZMB 3
ANYI 0.58 CIV 2 MADI 0.42 SDN 2
ASBEN 0.89 NER 2 MADI 0.58 UGA 2
ASBEN 0.11 DZA 2 MAKONDE 0.56 MOZ 2
ASSINI 0.51 GHA 2 MAKONDE 0.44 TZA 2
ASSINI 0.49 CIV 2 MALINKE 0.03 GMB 6
ATTA 0.51 MAR 2 MALINKE 0.13 CIV 6
ATTA 0.49 DZA 2 MALINKE 0.27 MLI 6
ATYUTI 0.13 GHA 2 MALINKE 0.04 GNB 6
ATYUTI 0.87 TGO 2 MALINKE 0.25 GIN 6
AULLIMINDEN 0.55 MLI 3 MALINKE 0.29 SEN 6
AULLIMINDEN 0.40 NER 3 MAMBILA 0.57 CMR 2
AULLIMINDEN 0.05 DZA 3 MAMBILA 0.43 NGA 2
AUSHI 0.27 ZAR 2 MANDARA 0.35 CMR 2
AUSHI 0.73 ZMB 2 MANDARA 0.65 NGA 2
AVATIME 0.51 GHA 2 MANGA 0.60 NER 2
AVATIME 0.49 TGO 2 MANGA 0.40 NGA 2
AZANDE 0.62 ZAR 3 MANYIKA 0.39 MOZ 2
AZANDE 0.15 CAF 3 MANYIKA 0.61 ZWE 2
AZANDE 0.23 SDN 3 MASAI 0.38 KEN 2
AZJER 0.24 LBY 3 MASAI 0.62 TZA 2
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AZJER 0.00 NER 3 MASALIT 0.13 TCD 2
AZJER 0.75 DZA 3 MASALIT 0.87 SDN 2
BABUKUR 0.82 ZAR 2 MASHI 0.12 AGO 2
BABUKUR 0.18 SDN 2 MASHI 0.88 ZMB 2
BAJUN 0.37 KEN 2 MASINA 0.82 MLI 3
BAJUN 0.63 SOM 2 MASINA 0.09 BFA 3
BALANTE 0.73 GNB 2 MASINA 0.09 MRT 3
BALANTE 0.27 SEN 2 MATAKAM 0.70 CMR 2
BANYUN 0.48 GNB 2 MATAKAM 0.30 NGA 2
BANYUN 0.52 SEN 2 MBERE 0.02 TCD 3
BANZIRI 0.14 ZAR 2 MBERE 0.24 CMR 3
BANZIRI 0.86 CAF 2 MBERE 0.74 CAF 3
BARABRA 0.31 EGY 2 MBUKUSHU 0.74 AGO 3
BARABRA 0.69 SDN 2 MBUKUSHU 0.15 BWA 3
BARARETTA 0.18 ETH 3 MBUKUSHU 0.12 NAM 3
BARARETTA 0.44 KEN 3 MBUNDA 0.89 AGO 2
BARARETTA 0.38 SOM 3 MBUNDA 0.11 ZMB 2
BARGU 0.77 BEN 4 MENDE 0.18 LBR 3
BARGU 0.03 NER 4 MENDE 0.82 SLE 3
BARGU 0.19 NGA 4 MINIANKA 0.01 CIV 3
BARGU 0.02 BFA 4 MINIANKA 0.72 MLI 3
BASHI 0.09 BDI 3 MINIANKA 0.27 BFA 3
BASHI 0.83 ZAR 3 MOMBERA 0.72 MWI 2
BASHI 0.08 RWA 3 MOMBERA 0.28 ZMB 2
BATA 0.29 CMR 2 MPEZENI 0.11 MWI 2
BATA 0.71 NGA 2 MPEZENI 0.89 ZMB 2
BAYA 0.20 CMR 2 MUNDANG 0.80 TCD 2
BAYA 0.80 CAF 2 MUNDANG 0.20 CMR 2
BERABISH 0.80 MLI 2 MUNDU 0.30 ZAR 2
BERABISH 0.20 MRT 2 MUNDU 0.70 SDN 2
BERTA 0.75 ETH 2 MUSGU 0.76 TCD 2
BERTA 0.25 SDN 2 MUSGU 0.24 CMR 2
BIDEYAT 0.21 LBY 4 NAFANA 0.74 GHA 2
BIDEYAT 0.40 TCD 4 NAFANA 0.26 CIV 2
BIDEYAT 0.03 EGY 4 NALU 0.41 GNB 2
BIDEYAT 0.36 SDN 4 NALU 0.59 GIN 2
BIRIFON 0.52 GHA 3 NAMA 0.18 ZAF 2
BIRIFON 0.47 BFA 3 NAMA 0.82 NAM 2
BOBO 0.20 MLI 2 NAUDEBA 0.87 BEN 2
BOBO 0.80 BFA 2 NAUDEBA 0.13 TGO 2
BOKI 0.22 CMR 2 NDAU 0.86 MOZ 2
BOKI 0.78 NGA 2 NDAU 0.14 ZWE 2
BONDJO 0.14 ZAR 2 NDEMBU 0.26 AGO 3
BONDJO 0.86 COG 2 NDEMBU 0.39 ZAR 3
BONI 0.67 KEN 2 NDEMBU 0.35 ZMB 3
BONI 0.33 SOM 2 NDOGO 0.01 ZAR 3
BORAN 0.46 ETH 2 NDOGO 0.18 CAF 3
BORAN 0.54 KEN 2 NDOGO 0.81 SDN 3
BRONG 0.84 GHA 2 NDUKA 0.23 TCD 2
BRONG 0.16 CIV 2 NDUKA 0.77 CAF 2
BUEM 0.40 GHA 2 NGAMA 0.30 TCD 2
BUEM 0.60 TGO 2 NGAMA 0.70 CAF 2
BULOM 0.85 SLE 2 NGERE 0.65 CIV 3
BULOM 0.15 GIN 2 NGERE 0.29 LBR 3
BUSA 0.14 BEN 2 NGERE 0.06 GIN 3
BUSA 0.86 NGA 2 NGUMBA 0.65 CMR 2
BWAKA 0.81 ZAR 3 NGUMBA 0.35 GNQ 2
BWAKA 0.15 CAF 3 NGWAKETSE 0.86 BWA 2
BWAKA 0.04 COG 3 NGWAKETSE 0.14 ZAF 2
CHAGA 0.24 KEN 2 NSENGA 0.15 MOZ 3
CHAGA 0.76 TZA 2 NSENGA 0.78 ZMB 3
CHAKOSSI 0.27 GHA 2 NSENGA 0.06 ZWE 3
CHAKOSSI 0.73 TGO 2 NSUNGLI 0.78 CMR 2
CHEWA 0.34 MWI 3 NSUNGLI 0.22 NGA 2
CHEWA 0.50 MOZ 3 NUKWE 0.44 AGO 4
CHEWA 0.16 ZMB 3 NUKWE 0.24 BWA 4
CHIGA 0.12 RWA 3 NUKWE 0.05 ZMB 4
CHIGA 0.87 UGA 3 NUKWE 0.26 NAM 4
CHOKWE 0.81 AGO 2 NUSAN 0.30 BWA 3
CHOKWE 0.19 ZAR 2 NUSAN 0.37 ZAF 3
COMORIANS 0.82 COM 2 NUSAN 0.33 NAM 3
COMORIANS 0.18 MYT 2 NYAKYUSA 0.12 MWI 2
DAGARI 0.67 GHA 2 NYAKYUSA 0.88 TZA 2
DAGARI 0.33 BFA 2 NYANGIYA 0.17 SDN 2
DARI 0.78 TCD 2 NYANGIYA 0.83 UGA 2
DARI 0.22 CMR 2 NYANJA 0.64 MWI 2
DAZA 0.27 TCD 2 NYANJA 0.36 MOZ 2
DAZA 0.73 NER 2 NYASA 0.05 MWI 3
DELIM 0.55 ESH 2 NYASA 0.68 MOZ 3
DELIM 0.45 MRT 2 NYASA 0.27 TZA 3
DENDI 0.60 BEN 3 NZANKARA 0.14 ZAR 2
DENDI 0.39 NER 3 NZANKARA 0.86 CAF 2
DIALONKE 0.36 MLI 3 PANDE 0.38 CAF 2
DIALONKE 0.58 GIN 3 PANDE 0.62 COG 2
DIALONKE 0.06 SEN 3 POPO 0.72 BEN 2
DIDINGA 0.04 KEN 3 POPO 0.28 TGO 2
DIDINGA 0.89 SDN 3 PUKU 0.31 CMR 3
DIDINGA 0.07 UGA 3 PUKU 0.49 GNQ 3
DIGO 0.62 KEN 2 PUKU 0.19 GAB 3
DIGO 0.38 TZA 2 REGEIBAT 0.34 ESH 2
DIOLA 0.14 GMB 3 REGEIBAT 0.66 MRT 2
DIOLA 0.07 GNB 3 RESHIAT 0.83 ETH 3
DIOLA 0.78 SEN 3 RESHIAT 0.06 KEN 3
DUMA 0.63 GAB 2 RESHIAT 0.11 SDN 3
DUMA 0.37 COG 2 RONGA 0.60 MOZ 3
DZEM 0.74 CMR 3 RONGA 0.35 ZAF 3
DZEM 0.03 GAB 3 RONGA 0.05 SWZ 3
DZEM 0.24 COG 3 RUANDA 0.02 BDI 5
EGBA 0.41 BEN 3 RUANDA 0.06 ZAR 5
EGBA 0.52 NGA 3 RUANDA 0.89 RWA 5
EGBA 0.07 TGO 3 RUANDA 0.02 TZA 5
EKOI 0.38 CMR 2 RUANDA 0.02 UGA 5
EKOI 0.62 NGA 2 RUNDI 0.76 BDI 4
ESA 0.03 DJI 3 RUNDI 0.04 RWA 4
ESA 0.52 ETH 3 RUNDI 0.20 TZA 4
ESA 0.44 SOM 3 RUNGA 0.74 TCD 3
EWE 0.44 GHA 2 RUNGA 0.26 CAF 3
EWE 0.56 TGO 2 SABEI 0.56 KEN 2
FANG 0.37 CMR 4 SABEI 0.44 UGA 2
FANG 0.07 GNQ 4 SAHO 0.43 ERI 2
FANG 0.54 GAB 4 SAHO 0.57 ETH 2
FANG 0.02 COG 4 SAMO 0.12 MLI 2
FON 0.86 BEN 3 SAMO 0.88 BFA 2
FON 0.14 TGO 3 SANGA 0.26 CMR 3
FOUTADJALON 0.01 MLI 4 SANGA 0.19 CAF 3
FOUTADJALON 0.11 GNB 4 SANGA 0.55 COG 3
FOUTADJALON 0.88 GIN 4 SEKE 0.34 GNQ 2
FOUTADJALON 0.01 SEN 4 SEKE 0.66 GAB 2
FUNGON 0.81 CMR 2 SHAMBALA 0.10 KEN 2
FUNGON 0.19 NGA 2 SHAMBALA 0.90 TZA 2
GADAMES 0.25 LBY 3 SHEBELLE 0.58 ETH 2
GADAMES 0.27 TUN 3 SHEBELLE 0.42 SOM 2
GADAMES 0.48 DZA 3 SHUWA 0.62 TCD 3
GIL 0.80 MAR 2 SHUWA 0.17 CMR 3
GIL 0.20 DZA 2 SHUWA 0.21 NGA 3
GOMANI 0.86 MWI 2 SONGHAI 0.57 MLI 3
GOMANI 0.14 MOZ 2 SONGHAI 0.36 NER 3
GREBO 0.33 CIV 2 SONGHAI 0.07 BFA 3
GREBO 0.67 LBR 2 SONINKE 0.68 MLI 3
GRUNSHI 0.68 GHA 2 SONINKE 0.03 SEN 3
GRUNSHI 0.32 BFA 2 SONINKE 0.29 MRT 3
GUDE 0.83 CMR 2 SOTHO 0.24 LSO 2
GUDE 0.17 NGA 2 SOTHO 0.76 ZAF 2
GULA 0.61 TCD 2 SUBIA 0.11 BWA 4
GULA 0.39 CAF 2 SUBIA 0.53 ZMB 4
GUN 0.48 BEN 2 SUBIA 0.06 ZWE 4
GUN 0.52 NGA 2 SUBIA 0.30 NAM 4
GURENSI 0.74 GHA 3 SUNDI 0.37 ZAR 2
GURENSI 0.13 TGO 3 SUNDI 0.63 COG 2
GURENSI 0.13 BFA 3 SURI 0.71 ETH 2
GURMA 0.15 BEN 4 SURI 0.29 SDN 2
GURMA 0.12 NER 4 SWAZI 0.45 ZAF 2
GURMA 0.01 TGO 4 SWAZI 0.55 SWZ 2
GURMA 0.72 BFA 4 TABWA 0.57 ZAR 2
GUSII 0.53 KEN 2 TABWA 0.43 ZMB 2
GUSII 0.47 TZA 2 TAJAKANT 0.15 MAR 4
HAMAMA 0.80 TUN 2 TAJAKANT 0.14 ESH 4
HAMAMA 0.20 DZA 2 TAJAKANT 0.66 DZA 4
HAUSA 0.14 NER 2 TAJAKANT 0.05 MRT 4
HAUSA 0.86 NGA 2 TAMA 0.30 TCD 2
HIECHWARE 0.81 BWA 2 TAMA 0.70 SDN 2
HIECHWARE 0.19 ZWE 2 TAWARA 0.57 MOZ 2
HLENGWE 0.82 MOZ 3 TAWARA 0.43 ZWE 2
HLENGWE 0.00 ZAF 3 TEDA 0.34 LBY 3
HLENGWE 0.18 ZWE 3 TEDA 0.35 TCD 3
HOLO 0.84 AGO 2 TEDA 0.31 NER 3
HOLO 0.16 ZAR 2 TEKE 0.31 ZAR 3
IBIBIO 0.11 CMR 2 TEKE 0.03 GAB 3
IBIBIO 0.89 NGA 2 TEKE 0.66 COG 3
IFORA 0.30 MLI 2 TEKNA 0.53 MAR 2
IFORA 0.70 DZA 2 TEKNA 0.47 ESH 2
IMRAGEN 0.10 MAR 3 TEM 0.17 BEN 2
IMRAGEN 0.74 ESH 3 TEM 0.83 TGO 2
IMRAGEN 0.16 MRT 3 TENDA 0.57 GIN 2
ISHAAK 0.20 ETH 2 TENDA 0.43 SEN 2
ISHAAK 0.80 SOM 2 THONGA 0.58 MOZ 3
IWA 0.33 TZA 2 THONGA 0.42 ZAF 3
IWA 0.67 ZMB 2 TIENGA 0.22 NER 3
JERID 0.90 TUN 2 TIENGA 0.78 NGA 3
JERID 0.10 DZA 2 TIGON 0.32 CMR 2
JIE 0.24 KEN 2 TIGON 0.68 NGA 2
JIE 0.76 UGA 2 TIGRINYA 0.51 ERI 3
KABRE 0.39 BEN 2 TIGRINYA 0.44 ETH 3
KABRE 0.61 TGO 2 TIGRINYA 0.05 SDN 3
KANEMBU 0.73 TCD 3 TLOKWA 0.14 BWA 3
KANEMBU 0.25 NER 3 TLOKWA 0.77 ZAF 3
KANEMBU 0.02 NGA 3 TLOKWA 0.09 ZWE 3
KAONDE 0.21 ZAR 2 TOMA 0.29 LBR 2
KAONDE 0.79 ZMB 2 TOMA 0.71 GIN 2
KAPSIKI 0.65 CMR 2 TONGA 0.84 ZMB 2
KAPSIKI 0.35 NGA 2 TONGA 0.16 ZWE 2
KARA 0.85 CAF 2 TRIBU 0.25 GHA 2
KARA 0.15 SDN 2 TRIBU 0.75 TGO 2
KARAMOJONG 0.27 KEN 2 TRIPOLITANIANS 0.74 LBY 2
KARAMOJONG 0.73 UGA 2 TRIPOLITANIANS 0.26 TUN 2
KARE 0.75 ZAR 2 TUBURI 0.25 TCD 2
KARE 0.25 CAF 2 TUBURI 0.75 CMR 2
KGATLA 0.13 BWA 2 TUKULOR 0.39 SEN 2
KGATLA 0.87 ZAF 2 TUKULOR 0.61 MRT 2
KISSI 0.12 LBR 3 TUMBUKA 0.74 MWI 2
KISSI 0.02 SLE 3 TUMBUKA 0.26 ZMB 2
KISSI 0.86 GIN 3 TUNISIANS 0.87 TUN 2
KOBA 0.89 BWA 2 TUNISIANS 0.13 DZA 2
KOBA 0.11 NAM 2 UDALAN 0.82 MLI 3
KOMA 0.57 ETH 2 UDALAN 0.05 NER 3
KOMA 0.43 SDN 2 UDALAN 0.13 BFA 3
KOMONO 0.49 CIV 2 VAI 0.76 LBR 2
KOMONO 0.51 BFA 2 VAI 0.24 SLE 2
KONGO 0.77 AGO 3 VENDA 0.70 ZAF 2
KONGO 0.23 ZAR 3 VENDA 0.30 ZWE 2
KONJO 0.81 ZAR 2 VILI 0.20 AGO 4
KONJO 0.19 UGA 2 VILI 0.22 ZAR 4
KONKOMBA 0.24 GHA 2 VILI 0.11 GAB 4
KONKOMBA 0.76 TGO 2 VILI 0.47 COG 4
KONO 0.74 SLE 2 WAKURA 0.28 CMR 2
KONO 0.26 GIN 2 WAKURA 0.72 NGA 2
KONYANKE 0.30 CIV 2 WANGA 0.79 KEN 2
KONYANKE 0.70 GIN 2 WANGA 0.21 UGA 2
KORANKO 0.39 SLE 2 WUM 0.88 CMR 2
KORANKO 0.61 GIN 2 WUM 0.12 NGA 2
KOTA 0.41 GAB 2 YAKA 0.16 AGO 2
KOTA 0.59 COG 2 YAKA 0.84 ZAR 2
KOTOKO 0.67 TCD 2 YAKOMA 0.40 ZAR 2
KOTOKO 0.33 CMR 2 YAKOMA 0.60 CAF 2
KPELLE 0.48 LBR 3 YALUNKA 0.25 SLE 2
KPELLE 0.52 GIN 3 YALUNKA 0.75 GIN 2
KRAN 0.16 CIV 2 YAO 0.13 MWI 3
KRAN 0.84 LBR 2 YAO 0.65 MOZ 3
KREISH 0.10 CAF 2 YAO 0.22 TZA 3
KREISH 0.90 SDN 2 YOMBE 0.13 AGO 3
KUNDA 0.84 MOZ 3 YOMBE 0.48 ZAR 3
KUNDA 0.15 ZMB 3 YOMBE 0.39 COG 3
KUNG 0.10 BWA 2 ZAGHAWA 0.14 TCD 2
KUNG 0.90 NAM 2 ZAGHAWA 0.86 SDN 2
KUNTA 0.85 MLI 2 ZEKARA 0.83 MAR 2
KUNTA 0.15 DZA 2 ZEKARA 0.17 DZA 2
KWANGARE 0.84 AGO 2 ZIMBA 0.16 MWI 2
KWANGARE 0.16 NAM 2 ZIMBA 0.84 MOZ 2
Appendix Table A reports the name of partitioned ethnic groups (as coded by Murdock (1959)) and the percentage of the 
historical homeland of the split ethnic groups that fall into more than one country. Section 2.1 gives details on our approach in 
identifying partitioned ethnicities.   
